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THE IMMIGRANT AND MIRANDA
Anjana Malhotra*
ABSTRACT
The recent dramatic convergence of immigration and criminal law is
transforming the immigration and criminal justice system. While scholars
have begun to examine some of the structural implications of this conver-
gence, this Article breaks new ground by examining judicial responses and
specifically the lens of Miranda v. Arizona. This Article examines the di-
vergent and largely aberrant approaches that federal appellate courts have
taken to determine whether Miranda warnings and rights apply to custodial
inquiries about immigration status that have clear criminal and civil impli-
cations. Part I of this Article discusses the distinctions between civil and
criminal immigration laws and the background principles of Miranda. Part
II synthesizes the various and inconsistent tests courts have used to deter-
mine whether Miranda applies to dual civil and criminal immigration in-
quiries and examines how the failure of lower courts to apply Miranda
consistently in the immigration context marks an unusual shift in the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence. It then explores how the emerging doctrine
for immigrants departs (1) from the Court's application of Miranda to dual
civil and criminal interrogations in the tax context; (2) from precedent
favoring objective tests; and (3) ultimately from the animating principles in
Miranda to bring clarity to police, suspects, and courts on the admissibility
of statements in custodial interrogations. Part III of this Article describes
the broader implications of these doctrinal shifts in light of significantly
increasing federal enforcement of criminal provisions of immigration laws
and the increasing number of local law enforcement officials who are un-
trained in immigration law and yet are involved in these prosecutions. It
also analyzes the incentive structure created by federal compensation pro-
grams for local law enforcement agencies to circumvent procedural protec-
tions for immigrants, relying on new data suggesting that the government's
aggressive criminal enforcement policy has raised serious constitutional is-
sues. Finally, Part IV explores the ways in which these trends reflect declin-
* Korematsu Clinical Teaching Fellow, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality, Seattle University School of Law. Many thanks to Robert Chang, Jenny Roberts,
Won Kidane, Nancy Morawetz, Hiroshi Motomura, Raven Lidman, Anil Kalhan, Alice
Ristroph, Jon Romberg, Holly Maguigan, Kenji Yoshino, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Adam
Steinman, Steven Bender, Michael Wishnie, and Lee Gelernt for their helpful conversa-
tions and reviews of earlier drafts; to David Alan Sklansky for sharing his insight and
groundbreaking research and analysis; and to Sandy Restrepo for her excellent research
assistance. I am also grateful for the helpful comments from workshop participants at the
Immigration Scholars Conference at American University School of Law, Washington Col-
lege of Law, and Seton Hall School of Law Faculty Scholarship Conference.
277
278 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
ing procedural protections in the realm of criminal prosecutions for
immigration-related offenses and proposes some solutions to ensure that
immigrants' rights are protected in criminal immigration enforcement.
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The Immigrant and Miranda
I. INTRODUCTIONIT is uncertain how Ernesto Miranda, born in Mesa, Arizona, became
Mexican, yet that is precisely what happened in the landmark case
Miranda v. Arizona.' Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for a 5-4 ma-
jority, incorrectly describes Miranda as an "indigent Mexican defen-
dant." 2 In the same paragraph where American-born Miranda becomes
Mexican, Warren describes Roy Allen Stewart, a defendant in one of the
companion cases decided with Miranda, as "an indigent Los Angeles Ne-
gro." 3 No racial or ethnic descriptors are provided for Michael Vignera or
Carl Calvin Westover, the defendants in the other two companion cases
consolidated with Miranda.
That Miranda was "Mexican," that Stewart was a "Los Angeles Ne-
gro," or that Vignera and Westover presumably were White,4 made no
doctrinal difference in the Court's decision, in which the Court held that a
post-arrest warning was constitutionally required before a custodial inter-
rogation. 5 That neither Mr. Miranda's ethnicity nor citizenship status-
nor even Stewart's race-was considered by the Court is not surprising
because the Court has held for more than a century that noncitizen crimi-
nal defendants are to be accorded the same panoply of constitutional
rights and protections as citizens. 6 Yet, in order for race, ethnicity, and
citizenship to be cognizable as legally irrelevant, difference must first be
named.7 Though Miranda is a criminal procedure case and not a formal
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
2. Id. We of course do not know what led Warren to ascribe "Mexican-ness" onto
Miranda, but perhaps this attribution of foreignness reflects what Juan Perea has described
as "symbolic deportation." Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible Peo-
ple, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 966 (1995). It is interesting to note that Harlan in his dissent
does not include the adjective, "Mexican," in his description of Miranda. See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 518 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("At this time Miranda was 23 years old, indigent, and
educated to the extent of completing half the ninth grade."). Further, the Court has
demonstrated that it is fully capable of correctly attributing ethnicity. See, e.g., Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 482 (1964) ("petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction"); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) ("petitioner, an American citizen of Japa-
nese descent"); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943) (same).
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
4. That Chief Justice Warren feels no need to attribute racial markers to Vignera and
Westover reflects what Barbara Flagg has described as the transparency phenomenon:
"Whites' 'consciousness' of whiteness is predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness. We
perceive and interact with other whites as individuals who have no significant racial charac-
teristics." Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 970 (1993).
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498.
6. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
7. Neil Gotanda describes constitutional colorblindness as relying on the technique of
nonrecognition-"noticing but not considering race." Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1991). Described in more detail,
"[n]onrecognition has three elements. First, there must be something which is cognizable as
a racial characteristic or classification. Second, the characteristic must be recognized.
Third, the characteristic must not be considered in a decision. For nonrecognition to make
sense, it must be possible to recognize something while not including it in making a deci-
sion." Id. at 16-17.
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''race case," the deployment of difference markers places Miranda within
the Warren Court's equality jurisprudence, where race, ethnicity, national
origin, and citizenship are irrelevant for determining constitutional crimi-
nal procedural safeguards.8 Ernesto Miranda became "Mexican" so that
it would be clear that the criminal justice system is meant to treat citizens
and noncitizens alike.9
However, this long-established unitary criminal justice system has be-
gun to unravel on a doctrinal and practical level, as seen in the following
example. In Morristown, New Jersey, law enforcement officials from the
Morris County Sheriff's Office ask every inmate in custody whether they
were born in the United States.10 If the individual answers "no," an offi-
cial informs Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") under the
State Criminal Alien Assistance Program ("SCAAP"), which compen-
sates the county if the inmate is subject to civil or criminal immigration
penalties." Pursuant to a state-wide policy, the Morris County Sheriff's
Department has taken the position that rights under Miranda v. Ari-
zona'2 do not apply to this, or any other ICE referral questions it asks
inmates about immigration status.13 Thus, despite the fact that answering
these questions could lead to prosecution for federal immigration crimes
having sentences of up to twenty years, officials do not provide Miranda
warnings to individuals before asking the ICE referral question, nor do
they know or ascertain whether inmates have been Mirandized or have
invoked their right to be silent or right to speak with an attorney prior to
questioning.14 Morris County law enforcement officials do not permit in-
8. See Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court's Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Proce-
dure, 43 CoNN. L. REv. 1, 3 (2010).
9. While individuals subject to civil deportation/removal proceedings are afforded a
different set of protections because removal is a civil penalty, the Supreme Court has not
only reaffirmed this doctrine of equality of constitutional protection for noncitizens, but in
fact strengthened the criminal procedural protections afforded to noncitizens in recent
years. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that the right to the
effective assistance of counsel can be violated by a criminal defense attorney's failure to
warn about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty).
10. Interview with Ed Rochford, Sherriff, Morris Cnty. & Frank Corrente, Undersher-
iff, Morris Cnty., (May 14, 2010) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with
Sheriff & Undersheriff]. In an official report, the Sheriff's Office stated that this question is
asked pursuant to "instructions and directives from ICE." Sheriff Edward Rochford, Chief
Ralph McGrane, Warden Frank Corrente, Staci Santucci, Esq., Morris County Sheriff's
Office, An Impact Review of the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement 287(g) Programs Upon the County of Morris, Submitted to the Morris County
Board of Chosen Freeholders (Oct. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Impact Review]. Although in
previous interviews, Undersheriff Corrente stated that this question is asked based on state
rules. Interview with Frank Corrente, Undersheriff, Morris Cnty., (Mar. 5, 2010) (notes on
file with author) [hereinafter Undersheriff Interview].
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i) (2006); Undersheriff Interview, supra note 10; Impact Review,
supra note 10, at 1.
12. 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966).
13. Interview with Sheriff & Undersheriff, supra note 10; Undersheriff Interview,
supra note 10.
14. Interview with Sheriff & Undersheriff, supra note 10; Undersheriff Interview,
supra note 10.
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dividuals to contact an attorney before answering this question's and
place individuals who remain silent into isolation until they respond.16
According to county officials, all New Jersey jails follow this ICE referral
system.' 7
Morris County's policies, which are similar to those throughout the
country, reflect the views of local law enforcement officials nationwide
who question hundreds of thousands of individuals a year about their im-
migration status, place of birth, or other facts that could lead to criminal
and civil immigration sanctions but do not require the same procedural
safeguards as other criminal law enforcement. Further, the failure or re-
fusal to provide Miranda warnings in this context has been approved by a
number of lower courts that have begun to tread dangerous new ground
by developing a new doctrinal exceptionalism in Miranda jurisprudence
for noncitizens. Although the Supreme Court in 1968 held in Mathis v.
United States'8 that the distinction of whether an initial custodial interro-
gation is intended for a civil or criminal investigation does not control the
analysis for Miranda purposes if the investigation could lead to criminal
charges, this rule has not been applied in the immigration context. In-
stead, many lower courts have applied an unusual subjective analysis to
determine whether Miranda rights apply to dual civil-criminal immigra-
tion questioning that diverges from the Court's focus on objective factors
in analyzing Miranda rights. This aberration in immigrants' rights is oc-
curring at a time when criminal immigration prosecutions are at a record
high, comprising more than half of the federal criminal docket.' 9 This
Article explores the roots of this new doctrinal exceptionalism and argues
that it runs counter to long-established Miranda jurisprudence and threat-
ens to create dual-track criminal procedure safeguards where one's Mi-
randa rights depend in part on one's status.20 This Article argues that this
exceptionalism is located in doctrinal confusion stemming from the dual
civil and criminal investigation of immigration violations. 21 Courts, per-
haps influenced by the plenary power doctrine's exceptional treatment of
15. Undersheriff Interview, supra note 10; Morris County Sheriff's Office May 12,
2010 Response to March 8, 2010 Open Records Act Request (on file with author) [herein-
after Office Response].
16. Office Response, supra note 15; Morris County Undersheriff Interview, supra note
10.
17. Interview with Sheriff & Undersheriff, supra note 10; Undersheriff Interview,
supra note 10; see N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1OA:31-6.1 (2012) (providing an "inmate popula-
tion accounting system" based on several factors).
18. 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).
19. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, FY 2009 Federal Prosecutions
Sharply Higher: Surge Driven by Steep Jump in Immigration Filings (2009) [hereinafter
"TRAC"], available at trac.syr.edu; Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Comment, Assembly-Line
Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 481, 511 (2010).
20. That is, a system where Miranda rights are not affected when custodial interroga-
tion relates to crimes such as robbery, etc., but are affected when custodial interrogation
relates to immigration matters.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 118-130.
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the border and its enforcement, 22 have improperly circumvented Mi-
randa's safeguards for certain immigrants, departing from a unitary crimi-
nal justice system.
The doctrinal confusion of courts on this issue compounds the already
serious implications of the federal government's significant structural
changes in immigration enforcement. Despite successfully challenging
Arizona's immigration law empowering local law enforcement, the U.S.
government has recently supported efforts to incentivize and enlist un-
trained state and local law enforcement officials throughout the country
as a front line for criminal and civil enforcement of immigration laws. 2 3
The federal government has increased financial incentives in programs
such as the SCAAP, which compensates local agencies to identify immi-
grants in violation of immigration laws and refer them to ICE.2 4 Unlike
federal immigration officers, however, these local law enforcement per-
sonnel receive no training in immigration law and immigrants' constitu-
tional protections. 25 Such programs incentivize local law enforcement
officers to abrogate noncitizens of their rights by providing compensation
to local jails for pre- and post-trial incarceration of "criminal aliens."26 In
the last five years, local officials have questioned and referred to ICE
some 1.65 million suspects under SCAAP 27 in hopes of identifying eligi-
ble individuals subject to civil or criminal immigration violations, thus ob-
taining a share of the $4.65 billion the federal government has allocated
for SCAAP since 2007.28 Consequently, courts are enabling and legitimiz-
ing practices and policies that are jeopardizing rights for noncitizen de-
fendants. In light of the unprecedented rate at which the federal
government is enforcing violations of immigration laws together with the
help of untrained local law enforcement officials, the risks of losing long-
standing procedural protections for immigrants is substantial.
22. For a discussion of the plenary power doctrine, see Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 853 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 546
(1990).
23. See, e.g., Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior
Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1161-63 (2008) (describing in-
creased role of state and local officials in enforcement of immigration laws); Juliet P.
Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C.
L. REv. 1557, 1557-58 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of
Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1084-88 (2004) (describing federal effort to
enlist local police in immigration enforcement after September 11th).
24. DOJ, FY 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET 156-57 (2012), available at http://www.jus-
tice.gov/jmd/2013justification/office/fyl3-ojp-justification.docx.
25. See, e.g., INT'L Ass'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE
ROLE OF STATE, TRIBAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2004), available at http://www.
theiacp.orgfPortalslo/pdfs/Publications/immigrationEnforcementsconf.pdf.
26. DOJ, supra note 24, at 157.
27. See BJS, FY 2007-2011 SCAAP Awards, SCAAP Data Masterfile [hereinafter
SCAAP AwARDS].
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i)(5)(A)-(C) (2006) (setting SCAAP appropriations at $750 mil-
lion for fiscal year 2006, $850 million for fiscal year 2007, and $950 million for fiscal years
2008-2011).
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Surprisingly, while there is rich scholarly literature addressing the seri-
ous constitutional deficiencies in civil immigration proceedings 29 and the
collateral consequences of criminal convictions on immigration status,30
the developing doctrinal inequalities in immigrants' well-established con-
stitutional protections and the resulting disproportionate impact on Lati-
nos has received little scholarly attention. Scholars have only recently
taken notice of the shifting landscape of immigration enforcement in the
criminal sphere, but such analysis has focused more on policy and institu-
tional shifts rather than on how courts are responding to these issues.31
Much of the "crimmigration" scholarship has primarily addressed the
convergence between immigration and local law enforcement of federal
immigration laws and the collateral consequences of immigration laws for
noncitizens.32
My goal is to add to the literature in two ways. First, I examine doctri-
nal dimensions of Miranda and how it treats immigrants. That is, I pro-
vide a sense of how federal courts are interpreting existing Miranda
jurisprudence to address the merged system of immigration enforcement
and criminal justice and, secondarily, the role local actors play as primary
gatekeepers in civil and criminal enforcement of immigration laws. I ad-
dress the question of how doctrine has shifted to create new rules for
immigrants in a once-uniform criminal justice system. Miranda rights pro-
vide a good prism for understanding how rights and rules are changing
for immigrants. Second, I provide a sense of the on-the-ground impact of
the new and confusing Miranda rules that courts have developed in light
of the unprecedented changes in criminal and civil immigration enforce-
ment. I examine how the shift in Miranda jurisprudence operates and on
what scale. In particular, I highlight the ways in which courts are com-
pounding institutional structures that are already altering immigrants'
rights in an unprecedented era of criminal immigration enforcement.
29. Jennifer M. Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudi-
cation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1604-06 (2010); Stephen
H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472, 499-500, 505-07 (2007) (arguing that
immigration law has "absorbied] the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities" of
criminal law enforcement); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime,
and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (arguing that the line between
immigration law and criminal law "has grown indistinct").
30. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000) (discussing the
changes to the law and critiquing reform proposals).
31. Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 135-36 (2009) (discussing scholarship on convergence of criminal justice and
immigration control regimes); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1281, 1294 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic
Boundaries of the Post-September 11th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. her'L L. & COM. REG.
639, 652 (2004) ("Deportation is now often a virtually automatic consequence of a nonci-
tizen's criminal conviction for even a minor state misdemeanor."); Hiroshi Motomura, The
Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the
Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1845-46 (2011); David Alan Sklansky, Crime,
Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 167 (2012).
32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Courts are redefining immigrants' rights, departing from long-established
jurisprudence. This has significant implications on the substantive rights
of both noncitizens and citizens in the criminal justice system, as well as
for the institutional actors charged with enforcing immigration law.
Part I of this Article discusses the distinctions between civil and crimi-
nal immigration laws and systems and the background Miranda princi-
ples. Part II synthesizes the various and inconsistent tests courts have
used to determine whether Miranda applies to dual civil and criminal in-
quiries and examines how the failure of lower courts to apply Miranda to
dual civil and criminal inquiries marks an unusual departure from the
Court's previous application of Miranda to civil-criminal inquiries in the
tax context. Part II also examines how such application departs from the
animating principles in Miranda that are meant to provide clarity to po-
lice, suspects, and courts on the admissibility of statements in custodial
interrogations. This failure also departs from recent trends in the Su-
preme Court's Miranda jurisprudence favoring an objective inquiry. Part
III of this Article describes the implications of these doctrinal shifts in
light of the significantly increasing federal enforcement of criminal provi-
sions of immigration laws and the increasing numbers of local law en-
forcement officials who are untrained in immigration law and are
involved in these prosecutions. It also analyzes the incentive structure
created by these federal compensation programs for officers to circum-
vent procedural protections for immigrants, relying on data that shows
how the government's aggressive criminal enforcement policy raises seri-
ous constitutional issues.
Finally, Part IV explores the ways in which these proceedings reflect
declining procedural protections in criminal prosecutions for immigra-
tion-related offenses and concludes by proposing ways that the criminal
justice system and federal and local immigration enforcement partner-
ships must be reformed to effectively address these issues. Specifically,
my proposals draw on strategies used by the IRS and the SEC to protect
suspects' rights in dual civil and criminal investigations in the tax and
securities context.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS
Federal immigration laws include both civil and criminal components,
codified by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).33 Until recently,
immigration has long been regulated in the civil sphere. 34 Unlawful pres-
ence, alone, is a civil violation.35 Although scholars have critiqued the
removal system as essentially punitive,36 the federal government uses a
33. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-26, 1329 (2006).
34. Chac6n, supra note 31, at 136; Sklansky, supra note 31, at 167-69.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
36. Legomsky, supra note 29, at 511 (observing that Supreme Court has long consid-
ered deportation or removal to be a civil sanction); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the
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civil regulatory process known as a "removal proceeding" to adjudicate
whether an individual is deportable based on immigration status.37 Dur-
ing the removal process, individuals are entitled to statutory rights, due
process, and other constitutional protections that share some overlap
with the criminal justice system, but not the full panoply of criminal pro-
cedural protections.38
The INA also contains criminal provisions for immigration violations.
For example, a person who enters the country illegally can be charged
and prosecuted for a misdemeanor, and reentry after deportation is pun-
ishable for up to twenty years.39 The INA also contains criminal sanctions
for entering the country without inspection or through false representa-
tions,40 Willful failure to register as an alien after thirty days following
entry into the country,41 illegal reentry following a deportation order, 42
and willful failure to depart or apply for travel documents after a depor-
tation order.43 Noncitizens facing criminal charges for immigration viola-
tions undergo identical criminal proceedings as citizens and are entitled
to the same panoply of procedural protections as U.S. citizens in all
phases of the criminal process.
To prosecute an immigration crime, federal prosecutors must follow
the same procedures as all federal crimes: obtain a grand jury indictment
of Federal charges, file those charges before an Article III court, and use
jury trials or plea bargaining to determine guilt. The Supreme Court es-
tablished a unitary criminal justice system for immigrants and citizens
more than a century ago in Wong Wing v. United States." There, the
Court invalidated a federal law passed during Chinese exclusion that, in
addition to civil deportation, imposed a criminal penalty of hard labor for
Chinese workers who were adjudicated through a summary proceeding to
be noncitizens or illegal residents.45 According to the Court, the law vio-
lated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by imposing criminal penalties for
immigration violations without a judicial trial because "all persons within
the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection."46 Since
Wong Wing, the Court has continued to reaffirm that noncitizen criminal
defendants are entitled to all criminal rights and protections, including
Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration
Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 345-46 (2008).
37. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1229.
38. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893); see also Chacdn,
supra note 29, at 1603-06; Stumpf, supra note 29, at 390-395.
39. 8 U.S.C. H§ 1325-26.
40. Id. § 1325(a)(2)-(3) (prohibiting entry into the country by eluding examination
and entry by use of false or misleading representation).
41. Id. §§ 1302, 1306 (stating that any alien who willfully fails to register after thirty
days can be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined up to $1000 or imprisoned up to six months
or both).
42. Id. § 1326(a).
43. Id. § 1253.
44. See 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
45. Id. at 230 (citing 27 Stat. 25, ch. 60, § 4 (1892), invalidated by Wong Wing, 163 U.S.
228).
46. Id. at 238.
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Miranda warnings and the right against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment. 47 Although, as described below, an upsurge in federal crim-
inal prosecutions and institutional shifts have recently blurred the bound-
aries between civil and criminal immigration laws,48 Congress and the
Supreme Court have formally maintained these distinctions.
B. MIRANDA WARNINGS IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT: THE RULE AND
THE RATIONALE
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 49 prohibits
the government from compelling any person to give testimonial state-
ments that may subject her to criminal prosecution or penalties regardless
of citizenship 50-in civil or criminal proceedings or in informal settings. 5 '
In Miranda v. Arizona,52 the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege requires the police to advise a suspect in custody, prior to
questioning, of the now-famous warnings: that she has the right to remain
silent and the right to the assistance of counsel during the interrogation,
or the functional equivalent. 53 A failure to do so will ordinarily result in
suppression unless the accused makes a voluntary, knowing, and intelli-
gent waiver of her rights. 54 In so holding, the Court extended the consti-
tutional safeguard against self-incrimination to informal settings,
including jail.55
The Miranda Court believed these rules were necessary to counteract
the "inherently coercive" nature of police interrogation, reflecting both
the Court's experience in reviewing interrogation abuses that routinely
took place at police stationhouses and its close review of the psychologi-
cal ploys described in police manuals.5 6 Recognizing that "custodial inter-
rogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the
47. See id.; see also United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998); Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953).
48. See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 31, at 1359 (noting that immigration enforcement and
criminal justice have merged into "a single, intertwined regulatory bureaucracy ... that
blurs and reshapes law enforcement power, prosecutorial incentives, and the aims of the
criminal law"); Sklansky, supra note 31, at 167.
49. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. (stating that no one "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.").
50. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) ("Even one whose presence in this coun-
try is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to . .. constitutional protection [under
the Fifth Amendment].")
51. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 7077 (1973) (holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination allows an individual "not to answer official ques-
tions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings").
52. 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).
53. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202-03 (1989) (holding that warnings must
be "'a fully effective equivalent"' of the Miranda language and "reasonably 'convey to [a
suspect] his rights as required by Miranda'" (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476; California
v. Prystock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted))).
54. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
55. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 436-38
(1987).
56. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-59.
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weakness of individuals," 5 7 the Court held that the warnings would "dissi-
pate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and, in so doing,
guard against abridgement of [a] suspect's Fifth Amendment rights."58
The Court was also concerned about the unwieldy, fact-intensive due pro-
cess voluntariness test that previously governed the admissibility of self-
incriminating statements made during custodial interrogations, which was
challenging for courts to administer 59 and for police to follow. 6 0 Thus, the
Miranda rules provided a more objective and "concrete"61 method for
courts to presumptively identify coerced statements and to guide police in
conducting constitutionally permissible custodial interrogations while
protecting suspects.62
Guided by these concerns for clarity, Miranda and its progeny held that
Miranda warnings and waivers are triggered before any custodial interro-
gation,63 during a criminal investigation," or during a civil investigation
that could result in a criminal prosecution.65 Government officials must
clearly administer the four warnings under Miranda in a manner that is
not misleading66 and must provide suspects the "[o]pportunity to exercise
these rights . . . throughout the interrogation." 6 7 Any waiver of these
rights must be knowing and intelligent.68 Once a suspect has invoked her
"right to silence" or "right to counsel," government officials must cease
all questioning of the suspect 69 until counsel is provided70 or the suspect
57. Id. at 455.
58. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986).
59. Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old
Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OIo ST. L.J. 733, 746-47 (1987).
60. See infra Part II.C.
61. The Court explained that it granted certiorari in Miranda to address the "problems
of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to
give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42.
62. Id.
63. The Court has subsequently required that "custody" and "interrogation" be de-
fined by objective factors and not by the subjective intent of the police or the belief of the
accused. See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1994) ("[T]he initial deter-
mination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on
the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being ques-
tioned."); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
64. Specifically, an individual facing custodial investigation "must be warned prior to
any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
65. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (requiring Miranda warn-
ings where the petitioner was questioned by the IRS regarding a civil matter that immedi-
ately led to a criminal investigation for tax fraud); United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d
1277, 1279 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360-61 (1981); United States v. Beale, 921
F.2d 1412, 1434-35 (11th Cir. 1991).
67. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
68. Id.
69. Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1975).
70. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 424-25 (1981).
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reinitiates further communication. 1 These waiver rules apply to subse-
quent questioning of the suspect about any offense 72 by any government
official who seeks to question the suspect. 73
While the Court has opted for objective rules and clarity since Miranda
was decided,74 it has also carved out a number of exceptions75 in circum-
stances where the underlying policy purposes for Miranda are absent.76
One such exception is the "booking exception," which exempts Miranda
warnings for questions essential to a police booking process, unless the
official should have known that the question would elicit an incriminating
response.77 Because some of the dual civil and criminal immigration Mi-
randa cases involve the booking process, the next section outlines the pa-
rameters of this exception and the Court's definition of interrogation
under Miranda.
C. INTERROGATION, THE BOOKING EXCEPTION, AND ITS EXCEPTION
Relevant to cases addressing dual civil and criminal immigration ques-
tioning, the Court has defined "interrogation" to mean questions, words,
or actions that are likely to be incriminating, measured objectively from
the perspective of the suspect.78 The Court has also held that Miranda
warnings generally do not need to be given prior to asking a suspect
booking questions about routine identifying information "normally at-
tendant to arrest and custody" because such questions do not usually
elicit incriminating responses. 79 The Court, however, has made clear that
Miranda applies to booking questions designed to elicit incriminating re-
sponses.80 As some courts assess whether dual criminal-civil immigration
custodial questioning constitutes "interrogation" and some analyze ques-
tions asked during booking, this section reviews the Court's decisions
about interrogation and the booking exception.
71. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146,149-56 (1990); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 424-25.
72. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683-84 (1988).
73. See id. at 687 (holding that an officer initiating a custodial interrogation must "de-
termine whether the suspect has previously requested counsel"); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 177 (1991).
74. See infra Part III.C.
75. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (creating 14-day break
in custody rule); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633-34 (2004) (applying exception
to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine for physical evidence); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (applying public safety exception to Miranda); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (allowing unwarned statements for impeachment purposes).
76. Scholars have criticized these exceptions as weakening Miranda protections and its
impact. See infra note 117.
77. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496
U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
78. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
79. Id.; see also United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The under-
lying rationale for the exception is that routine booking questions do not constitute inter-
rogation because they do not normally elicit incriminating responses.").
80. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14 ("Without obtaining a waiver of the suspect's Miranda
rights, the police may not ask questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit
incriminatory admissions." (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae support-
ing Petitioner at 13, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (No. 89-213))).
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The Supreme Court provided guidance on both the definition of "inter-
rogation" and the booking exception in Rhode Island v. Innis81 and Penn-
sylvania v. Muniz.82 In Innis, a suspect, made incriminating statements in
response to a statement made by one of the police officers in a conversa-
tion with another officer.83 The statements were made during the ride to
the police station but after the suspect had invoked his Miranda right to
counsel. In deciding whether the officer's statement violated the suspect's
Miranda rights, the Supreme Court defined interrogation for purposes of
Miranda to include both express questioning and its "functional
equivalent," or "any words or actions on the part of police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." 84 Reflecting the Miranda Court's concerns with safeguarding
suspects from a coercive interrogation environment, the Court held that
the interrogation inquiry turns on the perceptions of the suspect, mea-
sured by an objective standard.85 While the Court made clear that inter-
rogation does not turn on the actual intent of the police,86 it observed in a
footnote that the actual intent of the police may be relevant if there is "a
police practice [that] is designed to elicit an incriminating response from
the accused."87 Read together, the Court in Innis used an objective test to
define whether certain questions or their functional equivalent are an in-
terrogation, allowing consideration of actual intent only as evidence of
police tactics designed to incriminate.88 This is consistent with Miranda
both for its focus on the suspect and for its emphasis on a clear, objective
inquiry. In dicta, it noted that an interrogation did not include questions
"normally attendant to arrest and custody. "89
81. 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
82. 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
83. Innis, 446 U.S. at 294-95. Innis was arrested in connection with a robbery with a
sawed-off shot gun. During the ride to the police station, the two officers transporting him
conversed among themselves when one officer stated, "there's a lot of handicapped chil-
dren running around this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with
shells and they might hurt themselves." Id. at 294-95. Innis then asked the police to turn
around so that he could show them where the gun that he used to kill the taxicab driver
was located, which was later used to criminally convict him. Id. at 295-96.
84. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). The Court defined an "incriminating response" to
mean "any response whether inculpatory or exculpatory-that the prosecution may seek to
introduce at trial." Id. at 302 n.5 (emphasis omitted).
85. See id. at 301; see also Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode
Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 1209, 1232-33 (1980).
86. Innis, 445 U.S. at 301 (the definition of interrogation focuses on "the perceptions
of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police . .. [to] reflect[ I the fact that the Mi-
randa safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of
protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the under-
lying intent of the police").
87. Id. at 301 n.7.
88. See id. at 301. The Court's decision surprised scholars at the time for its broad
definition of interrogation, its focus on the perspective of the suspect, and its clear objec-
tive standards. See, e.g., Jesse C. Stewart, The Untold Story of Rhode Island v. Innis: Justice
Potter Steward and the Development of Modern Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 97 VA. L.
REV. 431, 439 (2011).
89. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (emphasis added).
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Ten years later, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Muniz90 reaffirmed the
objective approach both in defining interrogation and in carving out the
booking exception. In Muniz, the defendant was arrested for driving
while intoxicated and was taken to the police station.91 At the station, the
booking officer asked Muniz, without providing Miranda warnings, for
his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, age, and the
date of his sixth birthday, which Muniz could not remember.92 The Court
held that the defendant's responses to basic identifying questions asked
without Miranda warnings were custodial interrogations but exempt from
Miranda; however, it held that Munre's response to the question about
his sixth birthday was inadmissible under Miranda.93 The Court reasoned
that Miranda applied to this question because it called "for a response
requiring him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or
belief, confronted with the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity, or silence"-"the
historical abuse[] against which the privilege against self-incrimination
was aimed." 94
A plurality of the Court held that the first six identifying questions
were exempt from Miranda because they were "limited, focused inquir-
ies" that were "for record-keeping purposes only" and designed to secure
the "biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial ser-
vices." 95 The Court reasoned that routine booking questions were "not
likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating purpose [by the
suspect]. "96 The plurality underscored, however, that the police may not
ask questions during booking that are "designed to elicit incriminatory
admissions." 97 In recognizing the booking exception, the Muniz plurality
cited to three courts of appeals cases, all of which carefully limited the
exception to routine questions necessary to secure biographical data,
where there was no objective evidence that the police used booking ques-
tions as a "guise" to gain incriminating evidence or to "subterfuge" sus-
pects' rights under Miranda.98 A fifth Justice, Justice Marshall, concurred
90. 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (Brennan, J. plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 585.
92. Id. at 585-86.
93. Id. at 600-01.
94. Id. at 595, 597, 600.
95. Id. at 601, 605 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 12, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (No. 89-213) (quoting United
States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 605.
97. Id. at 602 n.14 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 13, Pennsylvania v. Munis, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (No. 89-213) (citing United States
v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d
1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 816 n.18 (11th Cir.
1982))).
98. Id.; Avery, 717 F.2d at 1024-25 (holding that Miranda did not apply to a statement
made in response to booking questions because they were "part of a routine procedure to
secure biographical data . . . . [that] did not relate, even tangentially, to criminal activity,"
and "there is no evidence that the defendant was particularly susceptible to these ques-
tions, or that police somehow used the questions to elicit an incriminating response from
the defendant"); Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1279-80 (holding that the booking exception
did not except INS agent from providing Miranda warnings before questioning suspect
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that all booking questions constituted custodial interrogation for pur-
poses of Miranda.99
When analyzed in light of the coercion concerns animating Miranda,
the exception of routine booking questions does not increase the compul-
sion perceived by a suspect above the level inherent in custody. On the
other hand, the Court made sure to maintain the fundamental purpose of
Miranda-protection against police coercion-by holding that the excep-
tion does not apply to questions asked during booking that are designed
to elicit incriminatory admissions.100 Notably, in recognizing the limita-
tion of the booking exception, the Muniz plurality cited to United States
v. Mata-Abundiz, which held that "[c]ivil as well as criminal interrogation
of in-custody defendants by INS investigators should generally be accom-
panied by the Miranda warnings."101 Observing that the test for the
booking exception to Miranda "is objective" and "[t]he subjective intent
of the agent is relevant but not conclusive," 10 2 the Court in Mata-
Abundiz concluded that the officer's statements that the interview was
meant to obtain biographical information for a "routine, civil investiga-
tion" was irrelevant in light of the objective factors suggesting that the
questions were likely to elicit an incriminating response. 103
As Mata-Abundiz and the facts of Muniz demonstrate, the Court de-
fined the booking exception narrowly to include only routine biographi-
cal questions, and intended that this exception, like the definition of
"interrogation" as an objective inquiry, should be analyzed from the per-
spective of the suspect.104 In elaborating on the interrogation inquiry in
Innis and Muniz, the Court continued to emphasize the importance of
focusing on the suspect, reflecting Miranda's purpose to counteract the
coercion inherent in custodial interrogation.105
Following Muniz, all courts of appeals outside the immigration context
recognized the booking exception, and most lower courts have generally
adopted the same objective inquiry and suspect-focused principles that
about biographical information concerning a suspect's immigration status because the
questions did not relate to booking and the agent should have known that a civil investiga-
tion could turn criminal); Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d at 816 n.18 (holding that a routine book-
ing question about a suspect's address was exempt from Miranda because the question was
"routine, biographical, and not intended to induce an incriminating response").
99. Justice Marshall reasoned that instead of creating a new Miranda booking excep-
tion it would be better "to maintain the clarity of the doctrine by requiring police to pref-
ace all direct questioning of a suspect with Miranda warnings." Muniz, 496 U.S. at 610
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. See id. at 601.
101. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1279.
102. Id. at 1280.
103. Id. at 1278, 1280.
104. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7(a), at 759 (3d ed. 2007)
("[I]t makes more sense to consider the objective purpose manifested by the police-that
is, what an objective observer with the same knowledge as the suspect would conclude the
police were up to."); White, supra note 85, at 1209; accord Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280.
105. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) ("Coercion is determined




the Court in Innis used to define "interrogation" and decide whether the
booking exception applies. 106 While a minority of federal courts and
some state courts have considered subjective factors related to the sus-
pect 107 or the officer 08 in applying the booking exception,109 the prevail-
ing view is that the inquiry turns on an objective analysis of whether the
interrogating officers reasonably should have known that the question
would elicit an incriminating response.110
Reflecting the concerns animating Miranda, most courts have limited
the booking exception"' to apply only to questions essential for booking
purposes that ask "simple identification information of the most basic
sort."1 1 2 To curb abuse of the booking exception, almost all courts of ap-
peals have held that the police may not use routine biographical question-
ing as a guise for obtaining incriminating information. 113
106. See, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 958 (8th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420, 423-424 (6th Cir. 2008); Rosa v. McCray, 396 F.3d 210,
222 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Reyes, 225 F.3d 71, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2000); United States
v. Bogle, 114 F.3d 1271, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1997), United States v. Brown, 101 F.3d 1272, 1274
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ventura, 85 F.3d 708, 711 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1043 (9th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986); Mata-Abundiz, 717
F.2d at 1280; United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Some courts held prior to Muniz that the
booking exception applied to all questions asked, even during booking. See, e.g., United
States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1989).
107. The Sixth Circuit has considered subjective factors from the perspective of the
suspect, United States v. Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1993), but has also held that
actual intent of the police is not relevant in applying the booking interrogation. United
States v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Absence of intent to interrogate, while
not irrelevant, is not determinative of whether police conduct constitutes interrogation.").
108. The Fourth and Fifth Circuit have both considered subjective factors from the per-
spective of both the suspect and the police. See, e.g., United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265
F.3d 276, 294 (5th Cir. 2001) (examining officer's intent to conclude booking exception did
not apply); see also Meghan S. Skelton & James G. Connell, III, The Routine Booking
Question Exception to Miranda, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 55, 87-92 (2004) (collecting cases).
109. Some state courts examine only whether the police were exercising an administra-
tive function without further inquiry. See, e.g., Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 569-60
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Whether this test is the appropriate one was recently raised in a
petition for certiorari. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Alford v. State, No. 11-
1318, 2012 WL 1553057 (U.S. 2012).
110. See, e.g., Rosa, 396 F.3d at 222; Bogle, 114 F.3d at 1275; Ventura, 85 F.3d at 711;
Henley, 984 F.2d at 1043 n.3; United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1993); United
States v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894
F.2d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1990); Disla, 805 F.2d at 1347; United States v. McLaughlin, 777
F.2d 388, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1985); Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280; United States v.
Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. 624, 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
111. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (quoting Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13) Rosa, 396 F.3d at 222; United
States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404, 406 (1st Cir. 1981).
112. United States v. LaValle, 521 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975); see United States
v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1076 (2d Cir. 1982).
113. See, e.g., Robinson v. Percy, 738 F.2d 214, 220 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hinkley, 672 F.2d 115,
123-26 (D.C. Cir. 1982); LaValle, 521 F.2d at 1113 n.2; Downing, 665 F.2d at 407; United
States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e recognize the potential for
abuse by law enforcement officers who might, under the guise of seeking objective or neu-
tral information, deliberately elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect.").
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III. THE EROSION OF MIRANDA THROUGH THE
EMERGENCE OF DOCTRINAL EXCEPTIONALISM IN
THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
This Part explores how lower courts have created an aberration to Mi-
randa jurisprudence in the immigration enforcement context by departing
from well-settled principles. While the Supreme Court has long adopted
an objective analysis to interpret the application of Miranda, the tests
used by lower courts in immigration cases have largely been subjective,
ambiguous, and in conflict with well-established Supreme Court authority
regarding dual civil and criminal interrogations. In addition, this emerg-
ing doctrine further conflicts with the clear tests in Miranda and its un-
derlying policies and principles. By subtle doctrinal manipulation, courts
are backtracking from a century of equal treatment of citizens and nonci-
tizens in the criminal justice system to exempt themselves from the well-
established requirements of Miranda. The current subjective approach
and misapplication of direct precedent diminishes immigrants' rights in a
significant way: the government may be permitted to label its investiga-
tion as a civil matter or an officer may plead ignorance to criminal immi-
gration laws to avoid the procedural guarantees of Miranda even when-
by design-the intent of the investigation is criminal in nature.114
One theoretical caveat must be made. In the forty-five years since Mi-
randa was decided, the Supreme Court has increasingly carved out excep-
tions to Miranda's core principles.115 While the conduct-regulating rules
requiring warnings prior to custodial interrogation have largely remained
the same, and while the Court has recently affirmed the constitutional
underpinnings of Miranda,116 the court has also effectively weakened the
legal significance of the police's failure to follow the rules. There is an
ongoing academic debate about the doctrine's protective value in light of
the Court's recent decisions and the contemporary interrogation tactics
police use to evade suspects' Miranda rights." 7 -However, even as the
114. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract
Framework, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1414 (2009); Eagly, supra note 31, at 1294.
115. See supra note 75.
116. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
117. Scholars have critiqued the Court for gutting Miranda of its protective value. See,
e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 21-23 (2010) (arguing that recent precedent has effec-
tively overruled Miranda); Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case:
Why We Needed It, How We Got It-and What Happened to It, 5 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 163,
178, 184 (2007); Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First
Century, 99 MIcH. L. REV. 1000, 1009-10, 1016-23 (2001) (observing that police have
learned to evade Miranda by interrogating outside of custodial settings or through psycho-
logical manipulation). But see Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylac-
tic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REv. 1030, 1061 (2001) (observing that most of the Supreme Court opinions
creating exceptions to Miranda "involved a good faith or unintentional violation of the
prophylactic rule, coupled with particularly high costs for implementing the rule"); Charles
D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1519, 1521, 1525 (2008) ("[TJhe




Court has made inroads into Miranda protections over the years, it has
done so in a way that has continued to provide a functional approach and
a test to guide law enforcement. The next Part discusses the development
of multi-factored tests used by lower courts in immigration cases that de-
part from the first and central interpretive principles in Miranda and its
progeny.
A. LOWER COURT CONFUSION ON MIRANDA WARNINGS IN DUAL
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL IMMIGRATION INQUIRIES
Though there is relative clarity regarding an objective definition of Mi-
randa rights during custodial interrogation, with a carefully-drawn ap-
proach to the booking exception to protect against inculpatory booking
questions, lower courts have been confounded when faced with custodial
questioning in dual civil and criminal interrogations to obtain immigra-
tion status, both within and outside of the booking context. There is a
circuit split on whether questioning detained suspects in dual civil-crimi-
nal immigration inquiries constitutes interrogation. The Second,118
Fourth,119 Eighth, 120 Tenth,121 and Eleventh 22 Circuits, and at least one
panel of the Ninth Circuit,123 have adopted a highly-unusual subjective
approach that analyzes the actual intent of the officer conducting the in-
terrogation. Relying on direct evidence of an officer's intent, these courts
look at a broad range of factors, including whether the officer (1) knew
the distinctions of civil and criminal law, (2) suspected violations of crimi-
nal or civil immigration laws, or (3) had background facts about the sus-
pect.124 These courts largely ignore the rule in Mathis, and have relied on
the plenary power doctrine to characterize dual criminal and civil interro-
gations as "civil."
The second approach, adopted by the First,125 Third,126 and several
panels of the Ninth Circuit,127 uses an objective multi-factor test based on
118. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2004).
119. See, e.g., United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 609 (4th Cir. 1994).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa-Gonzalez, 598 F.3d 1033, 1038 (8th Cir. 2010).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Medrano, 356 F. App'x 102, 107 (10th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2009).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002). But see
United States v. Chen, 439 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gonzalez-
Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d
1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983).
124. See Ochoa-Gonzalez, 598 F.3d at 1039; Mendrano, 356 F. App'x at 107; Lopez-
Garcia, 556 F.3d at 1316; United States v. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2004);
Salgado, 292 F.3d at 1172; United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 609 (4th Cir. 1994);
Parra, 2 F.3d at 1068.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.)
("The question is an objective one; the officer's actual belief or intent is relevant, but it is
not conclusive." (emphasis omitted)).
126. United States v. Carvajal-Garcia, 54 F. App'x 732, 733 (3d Cir. 2002). Notably, the
Court expressed its agreement with a Ninth Circuit case that held that an officer need not
suspect that an immigration inquiry would lead to a criminal charge. Id.
127. See, e.g., Chen, 439 F.3d at 1040; Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1046-47; Mata-
Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280.
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Innis that is focused on the suspect to examine whether, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the officer objectively should have known
that questioning was likely to elicit incriminating information. 128 In this
approach, the officer's intent is relevant but not determinative, and thus
this approach is more consonant with the Court's guidance in Miranda,
Innis, and Muniz.129
This is not to say that courts of appeals within these two categories
consistently apply one approach to determine whether Miranda rights ap-
ply in dual civil and criminal inquiries, as there are variances in ap-
proaches between and within circuits and differences in the factors courts
consider relevant to the analysis. For example, some courts hold that Mi-
randa unequivocally applies to dual civil and criminal booking inquiries
about information related to immigration status, because "while there is
usually nothing objectionable about asking a detainee his place of birth,
the same question assumes a completely different character when an INS
agent asks it of a person he suspects is an illegal alien." 130 Other courts,
even within the same circuit, have applied the booking exception to hold
that Miranda does not cover immigration-status related inquiries, regard-
less of the officer's intent. 131 In deciding this issue, courts generally focus
on factors not traditionally considered in defining interrogation, booking
exceptions, and Miranda jurisprudence. As described below, the aberra-
tion in Miranda jurisprudence for immigrants raises some troubling issues
for uniformity, guidance to law enforcement officers, and the unitary
criminal justice system that has long protected immigrants and citizens
equally.
1. Subjective Intent of Law Enforcement Officers
The Second, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as one panel
of the Ninth Circuit, have adopted a subjective test to define interroga-
tion and the booking exception for Miranda purposes in dual civil and
criminal immigration inquiries. These courts focus on the actual criminal
"investigative intent" of the government official to determine whether he
subjectively intended to elicit an incriminating response for a criminal
violation.132 This highly fact-intensive analysis turns on factors including
the officer's particular knowledge about the criminal immigration provi-
128. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 446, 301 (1980).
129. See, e.g., Chen, 439 F.3d at 1040 ("The investigating officer's subjective intent is
relevant but not determinative, because the focus is on the perception of the defendant.");
Doe, 878 F.2d at 1551 ("The question is an objective one; the officer's actual belief or
intent is relevant, but it is not conclusive." (emphasis omitted)).
130. See, e.g., United Sates v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Gon-
zalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1046-47, United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222,
1225-26 (9th Cir. 1988); Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280; United States v. Aragon-Ruiz,
551 F. Supp. 2d 904, 933 (D. Minn. 2008).
131. Compare United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002), and United
States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993), with Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280,
and United States v. Medrano, 356 F. App'x 102, 107 (10th Cir. 2009).
132. United States v. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2004).
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sions, the officer's intent or authority to charge the suspect with an immi-
gration-related crime, and the officer's suspicions that the suspect has
committed an immigration crime. 133
In applying this test, courts often rely exclusively on an officer's sworn
testimony to determine his intent to elicit criminal charges, despite objec-
tive evidence to the contrary, as well as the officer's authority to bring
criminal charges. The Eleventh Circuit took this approach in United States
v. Lopez-Garcia,134 where a local police officer deputized to enforce im-
migration laws pursuant to a federal-local 287(g) agreement 35 ques-
tioned Jorge Lopez-Garcia about his immigration status one day after his
arrest for driving without a valid driver's license and drug possession.136
Without providing Miranda warnings, the officer asked Lopez-Garcia
about his immigration status and informed him that if he did not have
valid immigration papers, immigration proceedings would be initiated
against him, he could see an immigration judge, or he could sign a waiver
to have his removal expedited. 3 7 Lopez-Garcia responded by admitting
he was born in Mexico and was in the U.S. illegally, which the govern-
ment subsequently used as evidence to criminally convict him of reenter-
ing the country after previously being deported. 38
The Eleventh Circuit held that the immigration questions did not con-
stitute "interrogation" under Miranda based on the officer's personal in-
tentions in questioning and his authority to prosecute immigration law.13 9
While referencing the Innis objective standard, the court relied on the
officer's sworn statement that he did not believe that Lopez-Garcia was
undocumented and, in any event, that he did not have the authority to
bring criminal charges against the suspect.140 The court further reasoned
that Miranda did not apply because the officer did not question the sus-
pect for "law enforcement purposes," but rather to determine whether he
should be subject to civil removal proceedings.141
In using a subjective test to analyze the officer's intent, the court ig-
nored several hard, ascertainable facts that suggested the officer "should
have known" his questions would elicit an incriminatory response and
that Lopez-Garcia may have felt coerced.142 The officer's intent could
have been discerned by the fact that he selected Lopez-Garcia for an in-
133. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1317 (11th Cir. 2009); Rod-
riguez, 356 F.3d at 258; Salgado, 292 F.3d at 1172.
134. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d at 1317.
135. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). Agreements pursuant to § 1357(g) or INA
§ 287(g) allow the federal government to delegate immigration enforcement authority to
state and local police pursuant to a formal agreement between the agencies and the De-
partment of Justice.
136. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d at 1311.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1311-12; see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2006).
139. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d at 1317.
140. Id.
141. Id. ("[D]eciding whether to bring criminal charges was, as he put it, 'not his
call.'").
142. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980).
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terview about his immigration status and began the interview by describ-
ing the consequences of not having lawful status. The officer then
provided the suspect with three options regarding his possible undocu-
mented status before asking him his place of birth and whether he had
any documentation in the United States.14 3 Furthermore, as the court ob-
served, the county's police procedures on immigration questioning pro-
vided that officers may only discuss deportation with suspects if they
determine the individual is undocumented, which the officer did prior to
asking the suspect about his status.144 Viewed objectively, the officer's
conduct during the interview and police procedures suggest he suspected
Lopez-Garcia did not have legal status, which the officer knew was a
criminal offense. 1 4 5
Other courts adopting the subjective approach have also focused on
the officer's knowledge of criminal immigration law and stated intent to
investigate civil violations to determine whether the officer was person-
ally aware that the questions could elicit incriminatory information. 146
For example, in United States v. Rodriguez,147 the Second Circuit held
that an ICE agent's questions to a prisoner in state custody about his
immigration status did not warrant Miranda warnings,148 even though the
agent was aware that Mr. Rodriguez deliberately overstayed his visa,
which is a criminal offense.149 The Second Circuit, however, found that
Miranda did not apply based on the agent's sworn statement because he
asked the questions for a civil purpose and "did not know that the infor-
mation that he elicited could be the basis for criminal prosecution."o50 As
143. Corrected Reply Brief of Appellant Jorge Lopez-Garcia at 7-8, United States v.
Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (No. 03-12662); see Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d at
1311.
144. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d at 1311.
145. See id.
146. United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002).
147. 356 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2004).
148. Id. at 256-57. The agent interviewed the suspect "pursuant to an INS policy of
interviewing inmates whose national origin is listed as unknown or somewhere other than
the United States." Id.
149. Id. at 259 ("Smith also testified that he was not aware that information that he
elicited could be the basis for criminal prosecution. Indeed, the only information that Rod-
riguez gave Agent Smith that might have been relevant to a prosecution was that Rodri-
guez, having entered the United States legally, had deliberately overstayed his visa.").
150. Id. The Second Circuit also reasoned that the ICE agent could not have possibly
known the statements were incriminating for Rodriguez's subsequent illegal reentry
charges because he did not illegally reenter the country until after the interview in ques-
tion. Id. Several district courts applying the subjective "actual criminal intent" test in Rod-
riguez have acknowledged the problems in relying on an officer's knowledge about the
civil and criminal distinctions in immigration law, and thus have held that it is sufficient if
officers engage in questioning to uncover a civil immigration violation. See, e.g., United
States v. Fnu Lnu, No. 09CR1207 (RPP), 2010 WL 1686199, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010)
("Those investigating a situation with possible criminal aspects rarely make the decision
whether to charge a suspect [and] . . . may have their own opinions about whether the
individual should be charged. But only the prosecutors will, generally speaking, have a true
understanding of the likelihood that a suspect will be charged."); United States v. Adoni-
Pena, No. 1:09-CR-28, 2009 WL 3568488 (D. Vt. 2009) (suppressing responses to officer's
questions place of nationality, citizenship, and immigration status in illegal reentry prose-
cution where officer testified that he was "primarily concerned with administrative depor-
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in Lopez-Garcia, the Second Circuit relied on the officer's sworn state-
ments about his subjective intent and knowledge of criminal immigration
law to hold that Miranda did not apply. This approach is also problem-
atic, as one court that rejected this formulation of the subjective test
found, because only prosecutors have a true understanding of the likeli-
hood that a suspect will be charged-"an immigration agent's testimony
that he or she did not think prosecution likely is of minimal significance
in determining whether the agent had investigative intent during the
interview." 51
Courts have also used a subjective test in applying the booking excep-
tion to exempt questions about immigration status, without regard to ob-
jective factors that suggest an investigatory intent. 152 For example, in
United States v. Salgado, the Ninth Circuit applied the booking exception
to a police officer's questioning of a suspect about alienage, relying on the
officer's testimony that he asked the question for a "true booking" pur-
pose and the fact that he was not an ICE criminal investigator. 1 5 3 How-
ever, by focusing on the officer's stated purpose and role, the Court
disregarded the fact that the officer asked the questions "as part of a
cooperative arrangement between the ICE and the Jail to identify Jail
detainees who were in the United States illegally and facilitate the initia-
tion of civil and criminal INS proceedings against them."154
The appellate courts using the subjective inquiry to determine whether
dual civil and criminal questioning constitutes interrogation are departing
from the clear mandates of Innis and Muniz, which establish that the
analysis of whether questions are considered interrogation is objective.
Subjective views are only relevant to this inquiry if there is "a police prac-
tice [that] is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the ac-
cused."155 The subjective approach in the criminal immigration context
turns the Court's clear rule on its head by focusing on officers' statements
that they did not intend to elicit an incriminating response and by ignor-
tation"); United States v. Toribio-Toribio, No. 09-cr-161, 2009 WL 2426015 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
6, 2009) (suppressing responses to agents' questions related to place of birth due to agent's
failure to administer Miranda warnings because "although the [officer] was primarily look-
ing into administrative deportation, he had ample reason to believe that Defendant was
falsely representing his citizenship and knew that such a false representation could give rise
to criminal charges").
151. Fnu Lnu, 2010 WL 1686199, at *9.
152. See United States v. Medrano, 356 F. App'x 102, 107 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that
Miranda warnings were not required where ICE agent's booking questions about suspect's
name were not an attempt to elicit incriminatory statements because the agent already
knew the suspect's name and immigration status); United States v. Valdez-Martinez, 267 F.
App'x 571 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding booking exception applied to ICE agent's biographical
questions because agent testified that he questioned the suspect for civil and not criminal
purposes and did not learn about facts supporting criminal charges until the un-Mirandized
interview); United States v. Salgado, 242 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 609 (4th Cir. 1994). But see United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058,
1067-68 (10th Cir. 1993).
153. Salgado, 292 F.3d at 1174.
154. Id. at 1179 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
155. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.7 (1980).
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ing affirmative police practices designed to elicit information for "civil
and criminal"156 immigration purposes. This approach has also ignored
the Court's mandate that the interrogation inquiry focus on the perspec-
tive of the suspect to counteract the effects of suspect coercion.157 None
of the courts using the subjective approach considered the perspective of
the suspect.
By ignoring these rules, these courts permitted questioning that could
obviously be self-incriminating in light of the criminal and civil immigra-
tion laws of the United States. The test yields a subjective test that is
unworkable and leads, at best, to a guessing game where judges have to
ascertain what a police officer was thinking. At worst, it allows courts to
rely on a sworn statement and makes Miranda turn on what an officer
says he intended, believed about the suspect, and knew about the law.
Both approaches result in an unstable body of law and undercut the clar-
ity of Miranda rules and immigrant suspects' constitutional protections.
2. Objective Test in Immigration Inquiries
The First, Third, Sixth, and a majority of panels in the Ninth Circuit
apply a more objective test to determine whether an officer's attempt to
elicit incriminating remarks invokes Miranda.'58 Generally, this approach
has been more protective and straightforward, but it has also resulted in
case-by-case multi-factored adjudication. Following Innis, these courts as-
sess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether police should
have known that questioning could produce an incriminating response
from the perspective of the suspect. 159 In contrast to the subjective test,
the officer's intent is relevant, but it is not determinative.160
The central factors these courts consider are the nature of the informa-
tion sought, the objective purpose of the questions, the content and cir-
cumstances of the questioning, and the relationship between the crime
and the immigration information. Under this approach, courts can inde-
pendently analyze the facts and evidence to determine what the officer
should have anticipated from a question, and can rely less on the stated
156. Salgado, 292 F.3d at 1179 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
157. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (stating that the definition of interrogation "focuses prima-
rily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police," and that
"[t]his focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in
custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices").
158. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Chen, 439 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Carvajal-Garcia, 54 F.
App'x 732, 734 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1046-47
(9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983).
159. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
160. See, e.g., Chen, 439 F.3d at 104 ("The investigating officer's subjective intent is
relevant but not determinative, because the focus is on the perception of the defendant.");
Doe, 878 F.2d at 1551 ("The question is an objective one; the officer's actual belief or
intent is relevant, but it is not conclusive.").
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intent of the police.161 In using this approach, courts generally find that
dual civil and criminal immigration booking inquiries constitute interro-
gation for Miranda purposes, and questions about "a detainee's place of
birth take[] on new meaning if the officer ... suspects that the individual
is an illegal alien."1 62
In applying the objective test to determine whether civil and criminal
questions about immigration status constitute interrogation or are subject
to the booking exception, courts examine the "content and context"163 of
questions about immigration status, regardless of the officer's stated in-
tent. The Third and Ninth Circuits, for example, have held that an immi-
gration agent's questions about a suspect's place of birth and immigration
status are designed to elicit incriminatory evidence when the officer had
objective reasons to believe that the suspect had violated a criminal immi-
gration law.164 Unlike the subjective test, the officer's sworn testimony
and knowledge of criminal law is irrelevant to the analysis.165
Similarly, courts also look to the relationship of a suspect's actual or
possible criminal charges and his immigration status if the officer knew or
should have known that the question would lead to an incriminating re-
sponse.166 Under this approach, the closer the connection between the
161. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, No. 07-20166-JWL, 2008 WL 2039013 (D. Kan.
May 12, 2008) ("While Agent Spake's subjective intent may have been an administrative
inquiry, the court finds that an objective view of the evidence shows that Agent Spake
knew or, at the very least should have known, that his questions were reasonably likely to
elicit incriminating responses both based on the NCIC information and the nature of the
questions asked.").
162. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1048.
163. Id. at 1047; see also United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1226-27 (9th
Cir. 1988), abrogated by Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (holding that an
immigration agent's questions about a suspect's biographical information constituted an
"interrogation" when it could be used to determine whether the suspect should be de-
ported or criminally prosecuted because it was linked to an offense with which he was
eventually charged).
164. United States v. Carvajal-Garcia, 54 F. App'x 732, 738 (3d Cir. 2002) (suggesting
that a suspect's Miranda rights were violated when immigration agents questioned the sus-
pect about his full name, date and place of birth for the purposes of determining if he had
been previously deported after the suspect had already invoked his right to counsel under
Miranda); Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1046 (holding that Miranda applied to a Border
Patrol agent's questioning of a suspect about his immigration status when the suspect was
referred to CBP by a parole officer who believed the suspect had been previously
deported).
165. See Carvajal-Garcia, 54 F. App'x at 732; Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1043.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1277, 1551-52 (1st Cir. 1989)
("[Q]uestions about citizenship, asked on the high seas, of a person present on a foreign
vessel with drugs aboard," constituted improper interrogation, since U.S. citizenship was
an element of the offense."); United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1279 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that an INS agent had reason to know that an admission regarding alienage,
"coupled with the evidence of firearms possession, could lead to federal prosecution");
Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1046-47 (statements elicited by border patrol agents about
detainee's immigration status and place of birth constituted improper interrogation be-
cause he suspected detainee of illegal reentry); United States v. Sepulveda-Sandoval, 729
F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1101 (D.S.D. 2010) (holding that Miranda warnings were required before
questioning suspect about immigration status because his answer provided incriminating
evidence for his criminal firearms charges); United States v. Lopez-Chamu, 373 F. Supp. 2d
1014, 1021 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that Miranda warnings were required for questions
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crime in question and the information sought, the stronger the inference
that the agent should have known that his inquiry was "reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."1 67
Several courts have held that Miranda applies where there is objective
evidence that an arresting officer 168 or state or federal prosecutor 69 SUS-
pects that an individual has violated civil immigration laws or is foreign-
born,170 without requiring evidence that the civil violation would lead to a
criminal charge.171 In the booking context, some courts examine whether
the relevant booking question was essential for administrative purposes,
recognizing that questions asked during a routine booking process about
place of birth constitute interrogation because such questions can lead to
illegal reentry charges or misdemeanor illegal entry offenses.172 This ap-
proach seeks to deter abuse of the civil process to circumvent Miranda
warnings.173
regarding nationality and citizenship where officer was aware that the suspect was previ-
ously deported and later charged with three counts of illegal re-entry following deporta-
tion); Thompson v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 110, 121 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
questions regarding citizenship were not exempt from Miranda during the booking of sus-
pects of "an undercover drug operation targeting illegal alien Jamaican nationals").
167. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1279.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, No. 8:08CR242, 2009 WL 703682 (D.
Neb. Mar. 16, 2009) (holding that Miranda warnings were required prior to ICE officers'
interviews with detainees about immigration status because it was based on local police
officers' hunch that they were undocumented immigrants).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Martinez, No. 6:05CR60016-001, 2006 WL
376474 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 9, 2006) (suppressing statements made in response to ICE agents'
questions about name and place of birth under Miranda and holding that questioning con-
stituted interrogation when based on state prosecutor's suspicion that the suspect was an
undocumented immigrant).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Equiha-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1225 n.7, abrogated by
Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 393 (1998) (9th Cir. 1988) ("The [a]gent's questions were
directed at eliciting information which could be used in a criminal investigation and poten-
tial prosecution of [the defendant] on charges of felony illegal entry."); Thompson v.
United States, 821 F. Supp. 110 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that the booking exception was inapplicable where immigration agent's question about
citizenship was designed to elicit information for deportation purposes): United States v.
Hernandez-Ruiz, 808 F. Supp. 717, 718 (D. Ariz. 1992).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Mellado-Enguallista, Crim. No. 08-307(1) (RHK/JKK),
2009 WL 161240, at *9 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2009) (holding that an ICE investigator should
know his questions could produce incriminating responses because his purpose was to
gather information for deportation proceeding).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Arango-Chairez, 875 F. Supp. 609, 611, 616 (D. Neb.
1994), affd, 66 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that unwarned statements made to an ICE
officer who interviewed the defendant shortly after he was taken into custody at a state
correctional center for traffic violations constituted "interrogation" and was not exempt
under booking exception because the immigration officer should have known that his ques-
tions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response); Mellado-Evanguelista,
2009 WL 161240, at *6 ("While the nature of the violation of the immigration laws-which
could range from the civilladministrative charge of deportation to felony criminal charges
for illegal reentry-remained to be seen at the time of the September 4 interview, no pen-
alty was ruled out."); Thompson, 821 F. Supp. at 120-121 (holding that the booking excep-
tion was inapplicable where immigration agent's question about citizenship was designed
to elicit information for deportation purposes); Hernandez-Ruiz, 808 F. Supp. at 718.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1279 (9th Cir. 1983) ("If
civil investigations by the INS were excluded from the Miranda rule, INS agents could
evade that rule by labeling all investigations as civil. Civil as well as criminal interrogation
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit has also found a federal jurisdiction's pattern
of federal immigration prosecutions and the timing of criminal charges' 74
after conducting a civil investigation relevant to whether questions about
immigration status are likely to elicit an incriminating response for Mi-
randa purposes. 7 5
B. DEPARTURE FROM SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON MIRANDA
PROTECTIONS AND FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN DUAL
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL INQUIRIES
Despite the variances among the circuits in the tests employed to deter-
mine whether Miranda applies to dual civil and criminal immigration
questioning, almost all courts that have considered the issue have de-
parted from the Supreme Court's well-established rule in Mathis v.
United StateS176 that Miranda rights apply to custodial questioning during
a civil investigation that could lead to criminal charges. In almost every
case to consider this issue in the immigration context, there was no dis-
pute that the officer sought and elicited information as part of a civil in-
vestigation that was later used to criminally convict the suspect of
immigration-related charges. However, courts largely ignored or misap-
plied the rule in Mathis by focusing the Miranda inquiry on the officer's
stated or objective intent to elicit information for a criminal purpose in-
stead on whether the officer asked the questions to elicit information as
part of a civil investigation, and whether it was likely that the investiga-
tion could result in criminal charges.
The Supreme Court held in Mathis v. United States that the distinction
of whether an initial custodial interrogation is intended to elicit informa-
tion for a civil or criminal investigation does not control the analysis for
Miranda purposes if the investigation could lead to criminal charges.177 In
Mathis, a civil IRS agent conducted two un-Mirandized interviews of an
inmate while he was incarcerated on unrelated state criminal charges as
part of a civil investigation that the government characterized as a "rou-
tine tax investigation where no criminal proceedings might be
brought."' 78 At the time of the interviews, the IRS had not initiated a
criminal investigation and the agent followed protocol for a civil tax in-
vestigation.179 More than one year after the inmate's initial interview, the
IRS brought criminal federal tax fraud charges against him based on
of in-custody defendants by INS investigators should generally be accompanied by the Mi-
randa warnings."); Mellado-Evanguelista, 2009 WL 161240, at *4 ("[The] Government can-
not avoid the requirements of Miranda simply by labeling immigration investigations 'civil'
or 'administrative' when its agents know or reasonably should know that the questions
they ask in the course of such investigations are likely to elicit incriminating responses.").
174. See, e.g., Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1280.
175. 439 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2006)
176. See 391 U.S. 1 (1967).
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id. at 4-5.
179. Id.
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statements he made during the un-Mirandized custodial interrogations. 80
The government argued that Miranda did not apply to the IRS agent's
questions because the inmate was questioned as part of a civil, and not
criminal, investigation, and also because he was being held on a separate
state criminal charge at the time of his interview. 81 The Mathis Court
rejected both contentions, holding that it was irrelevant that he was ques-
tioned about conduct unrelated to the state criminal offense for which he
was incarcerated. The Court further held that Miranda warnings were re-
quired since there was a possibility during the investigation that the in-
mate's responses could result in a criminal prosecution, observing that
"tax investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions, just as the
one here did."182 The Court concluded that the un-Mirandized statements
made by the defendant should have been suppressed, and it reversed the
tax fraud conviction.
The Court in Mathis intentionally adopted a clear rule' 83 that applied
Miranda rights to civil investigations that could result in criminal charges,
finding the differences between the two types of investigations "too mi-
nor and shadowy to justify a departure from the well-considered conclu-
sions of Miranda."184 The only factors the Court found relevant in
adopting this rule in the tax context were that the suspect was questioned
while in custody, and that there was a possibility that criminal charges
could result from the civil investigation. The Court based its latter finding
on a general observation of the frequency with which civil tax investiga-
tions lead to criminal investigations and the short timeframe between the
initiation of criminal charges and the suspect's last interview, although
neither of these factors appear to be dispositive.185 To understand the full
import and clarity of the Court's holding in Mathis, it is important to con-
sider what the Court expressly held was irrelevant to its decision: no crim-
inal investigation had been commenced at the time of either of the
interviews; there was no certainty that criminal proceedings would be
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Id. at 4-5.
183. Mathis has been viewed as a literal and accurate extension of Miranda that reflects
the decision's rationale. See, e.g., Daniel Yeager, Rethinking Custodial Interrogation, 28
AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1, 65 (1991); Mary Crossley, Miranda and the State Constitutions: State
Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1693, 1708 n.8 (1986).
184. Mathis, 391 U.S. at 3-4.
185. As the dissent in Mathis and subsequent commentators have pointed out, the
Court's premise that civil tax investigations frequently lead to criminal charges appears to
be overstated, as civil tax investigations are "widespread," and around the time Mathis was
decided only about 1 in 2,000 IRS civil investigations led to criminal charges. See, e.g.,
Mathis, 391 U.S. at 7 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that civil tax liability investigations are
"widespread," and noting "the thousands of inquiries into tax liability made annually ...
whose goal is only to settle fairly the civil accounts between the United States and its
citizens."); Gregory L. Diskant, Exclusion of Confessions Obtained Without Miranda
Warnings in Civil Tax Fraud. Proceedings, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1288, 1291-92 & n.42
(1973). In addition, the Court's observation of the proximity of timing between the last
civil and criminal interview does not appear to be controlling, as the Court also found that
Miranda applied to the IRS agent's first interview, which occurred more than a year prior
to the IRS's initiation of criminal charges. Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4.
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brought against the suspect;186 the suspect was questioned about conduct
unrelated to the offense for which he was incarcerated; the agent only
asked the suspect two questions;187 the agent's stated purpose of the in-
terview was to elicit information for a civil, and not criminal, investiga-
tion; and the IRS agent was a civil investigator. In announcing a clear rule
with limited exceptions, the Mathis Court reflected the concerns in Mi-
randa for clarity 88 and for protecting suspects against police abuse and
also against the ability for government officials to engage in subterfuge by
using civil investigations to obtain evidence for criminal charges.189
Consistent with the rule in Mathis, the Supreme Court has never re-
quired certainty of a criminal prosecution as a predicate for Miranda
warnings or the ability of a suspect to invoke her Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.190 The Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination applies not only at criminal trials, but also in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might
incriminate the defendant in future criminal proceedings.191 The Court
has held that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends to any questions
and "not only extend[s] 'to answers that would in themselves support a
conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant."' 192 Likewise, in
Innis, the Court noted that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
186. The government characterized the interview as a "routine tax investigation where
no criminal proceedings might be brought." Mathis, 391 U.S. at 5.
187. Id. at 3 n.2.
188. Id. The Court stated in full:
It is true that a 'routine tax investigation' may be initiated for the purpose of
a civil action rather than criminal prosecution. To this extent tax investiga-
tions differ from investigations of murder, robbery, and other crimes. But tax
investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions, just as the one here
did. Id. at 4.
189. Milton Handler, Some Practical Problems In Current Antitrust Litigation, 45
F.R.D. 293, 323 (1968) (citing Mathis, 391 U.S. at 1).
190. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1975); cf Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963) (Fifth and Sixth Amendment criminal procedural rights required
for federal civil divestiture action to deprive individual of American citizenship as penalty
for divestment action). See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Crimi-
nal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325 (1991).
191. United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 214-15 (3rd Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has
a straightforward definition of an "incriminating response": it encompasses "any re-
sponse-whether inculpatory or exculpatory-that the prosecution may seek to introduce
at trial." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980).
192. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20 (2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 38
(2000). The Supreme Court has made clear that any witness may invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination "in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administra-
tive or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory" when his compelled testimony would create
a real danger of domestic criminal prosecution. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444
(1972); see also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.
420, 426 (1984); Leftkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-79 (1973). During a removal proceed-
ing, an individual can invoke the Fifth Amendment, so long as his answers would not sub-
ject him to prosecution in the United States, see, e.g., Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455
F.3d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006); Valeros v. INS, 387 F.2d 921, 921 (7th Cir. 1967), but
silence may be used as the basis for drawing certain adverse inferences at least with respect
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incrimination does not "distinguish degrees of incrimination."19 3
The Court's holding in Mathis should be binding in the immigration
context given recent trends in civil and criminal immigration enforcement
and the similarities in the immigration and tax enforcement systems. The
Court's observation in Mathis-that civil "tax investigations frequently
lead to criminal prosecutions"-holds equally true in the immigration
context, and perhaps even more acutely than in the tax context, even
when Mathis was decided. As described in more detail in Part III.A, the
recent adoption in certain jurisdictions of "zero tolerance" programs de-
signed to criminally prosecute all apprehended undocumented migrants
has dramatically increased the sheer number of immigrant projections
and the odds that immigrants will be referred for criminal prosecution by
civil immigration authorities.194 In 2011, civil immigration enforcement
agents referred 89,874 cases for federal criminal prosecution, 95 and the
Customs and Border Patrol referred one in five of all individuals it ar-
rested to the DOJ for criminal prosecution, or about 69,080 people.196 In
contrast, around the time Mathis was decided, the IRS recommended
1,067 cases for criminal tax fraud prosecution, and about 1 in 2,000 IRS
civil investigations led to criminal charges.'97 Since Mathis, criminal tax
prosecutions have increased slightly; in 2010, the IRS referred 1,507 indi-
viduals for prosecution of criminal tax fraud.198 Civil compliance officers
referred about one-third (or 539) of these cases' 99 to the IRS Criminal
Unit out of 1,581,394 routine civil examinations. 200
to non-incriminatory matters. See. e.g., Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir.
1975).
193. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.5.
194. Compare infra Part III.A, and Lydgate, supra note 19, at 511 (analyzing Operation
Streamline, a federal enforcement initiative that requires the criminal prosecution of un-
lawful border crossers on the U.S.-Mexico border), and Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Dark-
ness: Involuntary Testimony and Silence as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 599, 603 (1990) ("Deportation proceedings frequently raise the possibility of
collateral criminal proceedings. For example, INA section 275 authorizes criminal prosecu-
tion for entry without inspection, which is perhaps the most common basis for deportation
of aliens in the United States."), with Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, FEDERAL TAX
& INCOME, ESTATE & GIFrs, § 114.9, at *1 (2012) ("In the audit process, the IRS unearths
far more cases exuding an aroma of tax evasion than can be prosecuted, given the limited
funds earmarked for the extensive investigations and prosecutorial efforts required to es-
tablish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.").
195. TRAC Immigration, Decline in Federal Criminal Immigration Prosecutions (2012),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/283/. During the same period, the IRS referred
1,583 criminal tax cases to the DOJ. TRAC Reports, Prosecutions for 2012 Referring
Agency: Internal Revenue Service (2012), http://tracfed.syr.edu.
196. TRAC Immigration, supra note 195.
197. Diskant, supra note 185, at 1291-92.
198. Enforcement Statistics, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uaclEnforcement-Statistics-Crimi-
nal-Investigation-(CI)-Enforcement-Strategy. The Criminal Investigations Unit initiated
2,889 criminal tax investigations. Id.
199. Treasury Inspector General For Tax Administration, Trends in Criminal Investiga-
tion's Enforcement Activities Showed Improvements for Fiscal Year 2010, With Gains in
Most Performance Indicators (Ref: 2011-30-068) 12 (2011).
200. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2010, at 22 (2010). Direct inter-
views by civil agents accounted for 342,762, or 17% of all civil examinations. Id. In 2010,
the IRS recorded 3,039,087 abated civil penalties. Id. at 42.
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The structure and practice of federal immigration and tax enforcement
also share a number of similar features which make the concerns articu-
lated in Mathis equally relevant in the immigration context. Similar to the
tax context, where "civil and criminal sanctions apply to the same con-
duct,"201 there is considerable overlap in criminal and civil provisions of
immigration laws.2 0 2 For example, illegal entry and reentry after removal
carry both criminal and civil penalties and accounted for 90% (72,000) of
all immigration convictions last year-due in large part to referrals from
agents conducting civil investigations. 203 In addition, civil IRS agents, like
civil immigration authorities, are the most common catalyst for criminal
tax investigations,204 and similar to tax, the point at which a civil immigra-
tion investigation turns criminal is ambiguous. 205 Furthermore, in both
tax and criminal immigration cases, the typical process of criminal investi-
gations is inverted: in non-tax and non-immigration criminal cases, the
government seeks to identify the perpetrator of an alleged crime; while in
tax and immigration cases, the government knows the identity of the al-
leged perpetrator and seeks to amass incriminating information. 206 This
makes a suspect's custodial statements of paramount importance, and in
practice both agencies rely primarily on a suspect's admissions to estab-
lish both civil and criminal violations. 207 This inverted process raises con-
cerns that agencies or officials could exert undue pressure on suspects to
obtain information, or circumvent a suspect's rights in the criminal pro-
cess by labeling the investigation as civil. Given the increasing criminal
penalties and rising criminal prosecutions for immigration violations,
201. Steven Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View
of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1966); see, e.g., IRC §§ 6662, 6663, 7201, 7203,
7206, 7207 (2006); see also Bittker & Lokken, supra note 194, at *2 ("[C]riminal [tax] fraud
provisions cover much of the same ground as the civil penalty").
202. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration En-
forcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819,
1828-30 (2011) (estimating that approximately 6.7 million non-citizens are subject to both
criminal and civil penalties for entering the United States illegally). Compare 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a) (2006) (criminal unlawful entry misdemeanor offense), with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (unlawful entry constitutes grounds for inadmissibility); compare 18
U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006) (possession or use of a false immigration document a removal
ground), with 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7) (2006) (providing criminal penalties for false represen-
tation of a Social Security number).
203. GRASSROOTs LEADERSHIP, OPERATION STREAMLINE: DROWNING JUSTICE AND
DRAINING DOLLARS ALONG THE Rio GRANDE 3 (2010), TRAC Immigration, Illegal Reen-
try Becomes Top Criminal Charge (2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/.
204. Amanda Cochran, Evidence Handed to the IRS Criminal Division on a 'Civil' Plat-
ter: Constitutional Infringements on Taxpayers, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 711
(2001).
205. Compare id. at 759 n.3 (citing United States v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535 (6th Cir.
1999)) (stating that many civil tax investigations are "covert criminal tax investigations"),
with Eagly, supra note 31, at 1294.
206. Cochran, supra note 204, at 707-08.
207. Compare Duke, supra note 201, at 18 ("The Government's use of the taxpayer's
statements to build up a net worth case, moreover, is not limited to statements obtained by
the agents from the defendant."), and Cochran, supra note 204, at 708, with Cuevas-Ortega
v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (in immigration context, "it is more likely than
not that the alien will freely answer the government agent's question").
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Mathis should directly control the analysis and application of Miranda
warnings in the immigration context. The structural similarities between
civil and criminal immigration laws and enforcement practices highlight
the need for courts to apply Mathis correctly in the immigration context.
Although the Mathis rule is binding on civil custodial interrogatories
about immigration status that could lead to criminal charges, most courts
of appeals have failed to apply this clear rule in the immigration context,
although courts adopting the objective test have been more faithful to the
Mathis inquiry. 208 Both approaches have generally overlooked the core
holding in Mathis by focusing exclusively on the officer's intent to elicit
information for a criminal offense, instead of examining whether the
questioning was for a civil violation that could result in criminal charges.
Courts adopting the subjective test in the Tenth, Eleventh, and some
panels of the Ninth Circuit did not even acknowledge or reference the
Court's straightforward holding in Mathis that Miranda applies to civil
investigations where criminal charges could result. In each of these cases,
the courts recognized that the officer had a civil investigatory purpose in
questioning the suspect about his immigration status, but did not consider
whether the officer intended to elicit information as part of a civil investi-
gation that could lead to criminal charges. Rather, the courts examined
whether the officers questioned the suspects with specific, actual intent to
bring criminal charges; had the authority to criminally charge the suspect;
or knew the distinctions between civil and criminal immigration law. 2 0 9
These factors were all rejected by the Court in Mathis, where it held that
Miranda applies to "routine" civil investigations if they could lead to a
criminal investigation even if the IRS agent had a civil investigatory pur-
pose and "no criminal proceedings might even be brought," 210 a result
208. See, e.g., United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983) (ap-
plying Mathis to hold that both civil and criminal interrogations of in-custody defendants
by INS investigators should generally be accompanied by Miranda warnings). ICE training
materials also do not reference Mathis rule. See, e.g., ICE Academy Master Powerpoint,
ICE, 75, 79 (Spring 2008) (requiring Miranda rights prior to arrests for felonies or crimes
committed in the presence of the officers); ICE Academy, Workbook: Statutory Authority,
28-29 (Fall 2007) (stating that an officer is only required to warn a suspect when there is
specific probable cause to believe that the individual being questioned is in violation of
criminal or civil of immigration laws).
209. United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1317 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that
Miranda warnings are not required for identity questions where officer was "simply tasked
with facilitating the removal of individuals illegally present in the country" and officer had
no basis to believe that suspect would be prosecuted for the offense or would admit to
illegal reentry); United States v. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d 254, 289 (2d. Cir. 2004) (finding that
Miranda did not apply during immigration officer's questions about place of birth where
the interview "was conducted solely for the purpose of determining whether Rodriguez
would be subject to administrative deportation after his release"); United States v. Sal-
gado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Miranda warnings are not required
before a civil immigration agent's "routine" questions about place of birth and citizenship
because the interview "was solely for the administrative purpose of determining whether
Salgado was deportable when he got out of jail" where there was no evidence the officer
intended to bring criminal charges, and the immigrant was not in jail for an offense related
to immigration laws).
210. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
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the Court reached without any reference to the subjective intent of the
IRS agent.211
The Second Circuit in RodrigueZ212 did address Mathis, but misread the
holding to require that a civil agent have certainty that criminal charges
would result from the civil investigation underway.213 Based on this read-
ing, the court distinguished Mathis by finding that the officer could not
possibly have known at the time of the interview that the suspect would
be criminally charged because the crime for which the suspect was actu-
ally prosecuted-illegal reentry after being deported-had yet to occur at
the time of the interview.214 However, the investigating agent testified
that he questioned Rodriguez to "determine whether Rodriguez was sub-
ject to administrative deportation proceedings," 2 1 5 and the suspect admit-
ted to visa fraud, which carries both criminal and civil penalties.216 The
court disregarded these similarities to Mathis by relying on the immigra-
tion agent's testimony that "he was not aware that information that he
elicited could be the basis for criminal prosecution." 2 1 7
While courts' use of the objective test generally resulted in an outcome
more faithful to Mathis by not considering an officer's subjective intent or
knowledge of immigration law, 2 1 8 the focus of this test also conflicts with
Mathis. As in these subjective cases, in the cases adopting the objective
approach, the officials questioned suspects to uncover civil immigration
violations. 219 Instead of assessing the likelihood that criminal charges
could result from the investigation, most courts examined whether there
were objective facts to suggest that the official had a criminal investiga-
tory purpose, despite Mathis's clear holding that criminal intent does not
control the analysis. 220
In theory, an objective inquiry into an officer's intent could be consis-
tent with Mathis if it focused on the categorical and institutional likeli-
hood that civil immigration interrogations could result in criminal
211. Yeager, supra note 183, at 11.
212. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d at 260.
213. Id. ("It is clear from the [Mathis] Court's recitation of the facts of the case that the
purpose of the investigation under consideration was, inter alia, to obtain evidence in con-
nection with a possible subsequent civil or criminal prosecution, criminal prosecution of
the defendant being a likely outcome." (citing Mathis, 391 U.S. at 2-3)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 256.
216. Id. at 259 ("Indeed, the only information that Rodriguez gave Agent Smith that
might have been relevant to a prosecution was that Rodriguez, having entered the United
State legally, had deliberately overstayed his visa. This is not a crime for which Rodriguez
was ever prosecuted.").
217. Id.
218. United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1990).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-DeLaCruz, No. 8:10CR336, 2011 WL 883962, at
*9-10 (D. Neb. Mar. 11, 2011). These courts conflated the Mathis and Innis inquiry with
the Muniz rule by framing the test as whether the officer should have believed that the
interrogation would result in criminal charges instead of whether the officer should have
believed the interrogation would yield civil violations that were likely to result in criminal
charges.
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charges; in some cases, there was overlap between the two inquiries. 221
However, most courts following the objective approach relied on factors
expressly or implicitly held irrelevant under Mathis to determine whether
Miranda applied, such as the relationship between the criminal charges
that the suspect was facing at the time of the interview and the suspect's
immigration status.222 But Mathis expressly rejected the government's ar-
gument that Miranda did not apply because the civil investigation was
unrelated to the suspect's underlying state criminal offense.223 In other
cases, courts considered the officer's knowledge about the suspect's back-
ground that could give rise to an inference of an immigration crime, or
the content of the questions in the civil interview.224 While the existence
of some of these facts could give rise to the likelihood that an individual
could face a criminal proceeding, Mathis did not consider the IRS agent's
intent or knowledge. 225 Rather, Mathis examined only the institutional
conduct-that civil IRS investigations "frequently lead" to criminal
charges and that the civil investigation at issue led the IRS to initiate
criminal charges shortly after the suspect's last custodial interview. 226
Notably, some courts considered factors that were present but not dis-
positive in Mathis, including the timing of criminal charges initiated after
a civil interrogation 227 and whether criminal charges resulted from the
civil investigation. 228
Several district courts have used an objective approach to apply Mathis
correctly in the immigration context,229 and at the appellate level one
221. See, e.g., Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d at 1279.
222. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1047 (considering relevant officer's
knowledge that suspect may have previously been deported); United States v. Carvajal-
Garcia, 54 F. App'x 732, 737-38 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d
1222, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998);
Gomez-De la Cruz, 2011 WL 883692, at *8-10 (noting when requested information is so
clearly linked to the suspected offense, a reasonable officer should be able to foresee his
questions might elicit an incriminating response from the individual being questioned);
United States v. Bernal, No. 8:1 0 CR 338, 2011 WL 1103360, at *9 (D. Neb. Mar. 23, 2011)
(finding Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections applied because the immigration of-
ficers were investigating identity theft, as opposed to immigration offenses).
223. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (holding that Miranda applies even
when a suspect is in custody for a crime unrelated to the purpose of an investigation).
224. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1047.
225. See Mathis, 391 U.S. at 3-4.
226. Id. at 4.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983) (ques-
tioning conducted by an immigration agent constituted an "interrogation" when agent ini-
tiated criminal investigation three hours after civil immigration investigation).
228. See Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1047 (suppressing un-Mirandized statements
elicited by border patrol officers when the statements were actually "used to help prove
the charges of illegal entry and being a deported alien found in the United States"); United
States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that an INS
agent's questions about a defendant's biographical information constituted an "interroga-
tion" when the information was used to determine whether the alien should be deported or
criminally prosecuted), abrogated by Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998); United
States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957, 961-62 (9th Cir. 1997).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Mellado-Evangelista, No. 08-2307(1) (RHK/JJK), 2009
WL 161240, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2009) (holding that Miranda was required for an ICE
agent's routine civil investigatory questions to gather information for deportation proceed-
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court has correctly analyzed Mathis in the immigration context.230 In
United States v. Chen, the Ninth Circuit held that Miranda applied to a
civil interrogation of a detained suspect's immigration status because he
faced a "heightened risk" of criminal prosecution in light of the govern-
ment's record of prosecuting misdemeanor reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325
in that particular jurisdiction.231 Although the court navigated through
Ninth Circuit precedent to reach this conclusion and relied on other fac-
tors to follow court precedent, its focus on the "practice of prosecuting
§ 1325 violations" was in line with the central inquiry in Mathis.2 3 2 Nota-
bly, in dicta, the court observed that the "inherent threat" of criminal
prosecution under § 1325 could potentially "render INS questioning
[about alienage] an interrogation" if the interviewing officer had reason
to suspect the defendant was foreign born.2 3 3
As several of the courts applying Mathis to the immigration context
have reasoned, the correct application of the Mathis holding is necessary
to prevent police abuse and preserve the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion for immigrants. As one court stated, "If civil investigations by the
INS were excluded from the Miranda rule, INS agents could evade that
rule by labeling all investigations as civil." 2 3 4 Mathis, then, serves as a
critical protection for suspects questioned about civil and criminal
charges by effectively holding "that the investigator cannot control the
constitutional question by placing a 'civil' label on the investigation." 2 3 5
By dismissing the weight and relevance of Mathis, lower courts are al-
lowing government officials to circumvent immigrants' core constitutional
protections and threaten the once-unitary criminal justice system. As in
the tax context, the absence of full protections in the immigration context
directly implicates the coercion concerns animating Miranda.236 The
Court in Illinois v. Perkins reasoned that warnings and clear rules were
needed because "[q]uestioning by captors, who appear to control the sus-
pect's fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has
assumed will weaken the suspect's will." 2 3 7 This protection holds espe-
cially true in dual civil and criminal interrogations about immigration sta-
tus, as discussed in Part III.B. Because the distinction between civil and
criminal investigations is difficult for police, much less courts, to clas-
sify-courts ignore the critical role that the Mathis rule serves in ensuring
"meaningful protection to Fifth Amendment rights" that was the "whole
ings because "[i]t follows from the Court's decision in Mathis that even if Agent Carey's
investigation was aimed at gathering information for a deportation hearing rather than for
prosecution of a specific crime, his questioning could still amount to interrogation for Mi-
randa purposes").
230. United States v. Chen, 439 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006).
231. Id. at 1040.
232. Id. at 1040-42.
233. Id. at 1042.
234. United States v. Mata-Abundiz, 717 F.2d 1277, 1279 (9th Cir. 1983).
235. Id. at 1280.
236. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
237. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990).
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purpose of the Miranda decision."23
C. REVERSAL TO A BYGONE ERA: COURTS ARE DEPARTING FROM
THE HISTORY ANIMATING MIRANDA THAT CONTINUES To ANIMATE
CONTEMPORARY MIRANDA JURISPRUDENCE
This section describes how the lower court decisions about Miranda
rights in dual civil and criminal immigration inquiries are also at odds
with two additional foundational principles of Miranda that continue to
underlie the Court's Miranda jurisprudence today: the use of objective
criteria, which the Court has favored to create clarity and workable rules
for police and courts considering the admissibility of custodial statements,
and the centrality of Miranda warnings to guide police and protect
suspects.
The central doctrinal import of Miranda was to reshape the previous
Fifth Amendment inquiry into the admissibility of statements obtained in
jailhouse interrogations, 239 which was previously governed by a fact-spe-
cific voluntariness analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.240 In the face of a constitutional standard that was unwieldy
both for courts to administer and for law enforcement agents to compre-
hend effectively, the Court attempted "to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 2 4 1 Even as
the Court has made inroads into Miranda protections in recent years by
diminishing the remedies for law enforcement's failure to adhere to the
rules announced in Miranda,242 the Court has left the warnings and the
use of objective criteria intact in its contemporary jurisprudence. 243
1. Return to Doctrinal Confusion
The new subjective and multi-factored tests that courts have adopted to
analyze whether immigrants' Miranda rights were violated represents a
238. Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4.
239. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966).
240. The Court first held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires suppression of a coerced confession in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
which reversed a conviction based on a torture-induced confession.
241. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42; see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
242. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772-73 (2003) (rejecting civil rights claim by
suspect subjected to abusive interrogation without Miranda warnings and holding that
"core" Miranda violations occur only when coerced statements are entered into evidence,
not when the coercion occurs); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the
Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1839-46 (1987).
243. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) ("By limiting analy-
sis to the objective circumstances of the interrogation, and asking how a reasonable person
in the suspect's position would understand his freedom to terminate questioning and leave,
the objective test avoids burdening police with the task of anticipating the idiosyncrasies of
every individual suspect and divining how those particular traits affect each person's sub-
jective state of mind."); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) ("Once the scene is
set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective
test to resolve 'the ultimate inquiry': '[was] there a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'") (alteration in original)
(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
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return to the doctrinal confusion that the Supreme Court sought to avoid
when it decided Miranda. While Miranda sought to establish safeguards
to protect suspects from coerced confessions, it was also premised on the
rejection of a subjective and highly fact-specific approach to the admissi-
bility of confessions that preceded Miranda, which caused confusion for
courts and law enforcement officials.244
Prior to the Court's decision in Miranda, courts used a "totality of the
circumstances" test to determine whether a confession was voluntary or
obtained through police misconduct or coercion in violation of the Due
Process Clause and the privilege against self-incrimination. 245 There was
no single test or approach that governed the admissibility of confes-
sions.246 Essentially, the voluntariness test required courts to assess
whether the police deprived a suspect of his free will, resulting in deep
inconsistencies in the law.2 4 7 The weaknesses of the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances test have been acknowledged by supporters of Miranda,248 as
well as its critics.249 As the Court described, "The voluntariness rubric
[that preceded Miranda] has been variously condemned as useless, per-
plexing, and legal double-talk." 2 5 0
In its many decisions on voluntariness prior to Miranda, the Court
adopted a test that was avowedly flexible and case-specific and that took
into account an expansive range of factors, with no single factor being
determinative. 251 The "totality of the circumstances" included an assess-
ment of the personal characteristics of the suspect in an effort to deter-
mine retrospectively whether the particular suspect had the ability to
withstand interrogation without breaking down.2 5 2 In other cases, the
personal characteristics of the suspect were (with the analysis focusing on
various aspects of police conduct, including the specific words used in the
interrogation) whether the suspect had been allowed to consult with fam-
ily members or counsel or had been advised of his right against self-in-
crimination.253 The Court also developed, as a matter of due process, a
244. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
245. See Herman, supra note 59, at 745; Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness"
Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1966); Ogletree, supra note 241, at 1837-38.
246. See Herman, supra note 59, at 745.
247. The test was a two-pronged inquiry directed at assessing whether the police used
coercion, and whether the coercion overcame the will of the suspect. See, e.g., Yeager,
supra note 183, at 4-7.
248. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court,
34 TULSA L.J. 465, 471-72 (1999).
249. See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA.
L. REV. 859, 863 (1979) (noting "the intolerable uncertainty that characterized the thirty-
year reign of the due process voluntariness doctrine").
250. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 n.4 (1985) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
251. See Herman, supra note 59, at 745.
252. See, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1961); Spany v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 321-22, 322 n.3 (1959); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957).
253. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559-61 (1954); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U.S. 62, 64 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1949); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 404-07 (1945).
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number of disjointed rules that held confessions inadmissible, regardless
of other circumstanceS254 such as physical force. 255
Because there are unlimited ways that police and suspects could inter-
act, courts expended substantial resources in parsing out the dynamics of
custodial interrogations. 256 With no clear test, courts found it challenging
to determine when an individual's will was overborne in a constitution-
ally-impermissible manner.257 Furthermore, because interrogations were
conducted out of the sight of third parties or judicial officers, determining
whether statements were coerced often involved a "'swearing contest"'
between police and suspects, causing courts to often err on the side of law
enforcement. 258
At the same time, the evolving values underlying the voluntariness test
changed over time, resulting in a "cornucopia of Due Process tests"
among lower courts, which the Supreme Court never effectively re-
solved.259 As a result, the analysis varied by jurisdiction without any uni-
form rules to guide it, making the standard an unwieldy one for the
Supreme Court and lower courts to administer effectively. 260 As Justice
Hugo Black remarked during oral argument in Miranda, "no court in the
land can ever know [whether the confession is admissible] until [the case]
comes to us." 2 6 1 The result was a conflicting body of law about what prac-
tices or circumstances the Court would find consistent with due pro-
cess, 262 preventing effective appellate guidance and control of trial court
254. See Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2195, 2237
(1996).
255. The Court explained that where there is "[plhysical violence or threat of it by the
custodian of a prisoner during detention," there "is no need to weigh or measure its effects
on the will of the individual victim," because such confessions are "too untrustworthy to be
received as evidence of guilt." Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953), overruled in
part by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); see also White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530,
532-33 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936).
256. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571-73, 636 (1961) (Warren, J.,
concurring) (warning that general principles are of little help in resolving the voluntariness
issue, and suggesting that the nature of the issue effectively compels "a case-by-case ap-
proach"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 683 (1984) (same).
257. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 683.
258. See Ogletree, supra note 242, at 1834 (quoting Steven J. Schulhofer, Confessions
and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865, 870-71 (1981)). In his dissent to Miranda, Justice
Harlan acknowledged the difficulties courts experienced in attempting to apply the former
Due Process Clause totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[In] more than 30 full opinions
.... the voluntariness rubric was .. . never pinned ... down to a single meaning but on the
contrary [the Court] infused it with a number of different values. . . . The outcome was a
continuing re-evaluation on the facts of each case of how much pressure on the suspect was
permissible." (citations omitted)).
259. Hancock, supra note 254, at 2237 ("[T]he Court usually never overruled a Due
Process precedent, and simply ignored inconsistent cases, or distinguished them when nec-
essary or convenient.").
260. See Kamisar, supra note 117, at 168. (stating that the test became "too amorphous,
too perplexing, too subjective and too time-consuming to administer effectively").
261. 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 894 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1966).
262. See Herman, supra note 59, at 752.
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application of the test.2 6 3 On a practical level, the inherent ambiguities of
the standard provided little guidance for police on how to conduct inter-
views.264 As one commentator noted, "[u]nder the 'totality of the circum-
stances approach, virtually everything is relevant and nothing is
determinative. If you place a premium on clarity, this is not a good
sign."265
In the face of this vague and inconsistent body of law, the Miranda
Court sought to resolve these contradictions and provide clear guidance
to law enforcement by creating a "concrete," objective, and easily-applied
rule for courts to assess the admissibility of custodial statements.266 The
Court explicitly rejected the previous case-by-case approach for deter-
mining voluntariness due to the inherent problems in discerning what oc-
curred during an interrogation and determining whether the suspect's will
had been overcome. 267 As the Court observed recently in upholding the
constitutional underpinnings in Miranda, it may sometimes be the case
that "a guilty defendant go[es] free," but the Court deemed that a lesser
disadvantage than trying to operate under a totality-of-the-circumstances
test, which "is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to
conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner." 268 Without
clear guidance, lower courts often upheld confessions that involved
clearly improper and abusive tactics. 269
Of course, Miranda, at its core, was also a way to protect suspects by
addressing the gaps created in the previous due process analysis, which
posed an "unacceptably great" risk that involuntary custodial confessions
would escape detection.270 Miranda thus represents a "carefully drawn
approach," 271 acknowledging that the "'principal advantage"' of the rules
announced in Miranda is their "ease and clarity of application." 2 7 2 Mi-
randa's requirements have "the virtue of informing police and prosecu-
tors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial
interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances state-
263. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 683 (1984) (recounting some history
of pre-Miranda analysis: "Difficulties of proof and subtleties of interrogation technique
made it impossible ... for the judiciary to decide with confidence whether the defendant
had voluntarily confessed his guilt or whether his testimony had been unconstitutionally
compelled. Courts ... [nationwide] were spending countless hours reviewing the facts of
individual custodial interrogations.").
264. See id.
265. Herman, supra note 59, at 745.
266. In Miranda, the Court explained that it granted certiorari to address the "problems
... of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to
give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) (emphasis added); see also Florida v.
Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1203 (2010) ("Intent on 'giv[ing] concrete constitutional guidelines
for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow,' Miranda prescribed the following four
now-familiar warnings." (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42) (citation omitted)).
267. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69.
268. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
269. See Schuthofer, supra note 258, at 869-70.
270. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442.
271. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986).
272. Id. at 425 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1934)).
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ments obtained during such interrogation are not admissible." 2 73
The highly subjective approach and the multi-factored objective tests
used by courts to decide whether Miranda applies to dual civil and crimi-
nal immigration interrogations returns immigrants to the pre-Miranda in-
terrogation rooms and courts of forty-five years ago. The difficulty of the
case-by-case analysis of immigrants' Miranda rights is made apparent by
the inconsistent results and disjointed rules. As in the pre-Miranda era,
the multiplicity of factors considered by these courts render "the test []
too amorphous, too perplexing, too subjective and too time-consuming to
administer effectively." 2 74 Reliance on the government's subjective intent
is rife with the same proof difficulties that were pervasive in the pre-Mi-
randa jurisprudence case law that turned on a "'swearing contest,"' 275
which, as in the due process cases, has been routinely won by law enforce-
ment officials.276 The refusal of most courts to apply binding Supreme
Court precedent from Mathis reflected the pre-Miranda era tendency of
courts to "simply ignore[] inconsistent cases, or distinguish[] them when
necessary or convenient." 2 7 7 Without clear guidance, lower courts are ex-
pending considerable resources to decide these cases and are frequently
upholding statements made by immigrants in violation of their Miranda
rights, thereby creating a substantial risk that officials will circumvent im-
migrants' Miranda rights.278
2. Departing from the Trend in Current Miranda Jurisprudence
In the years since Miranda was decided, the Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed its rejection of unpredictable and inconsistent subjective tests in
favor of the more consistent approach and objective test established in
Miranda,279 as described above, regarding the Court's rules about inter-
rogation. This has held true even as the Court has developed a number of
exceptions that effectively weaken Miranda's protective power and im-
pact on law enforcement. 280 While the Court has shifted the overall ratio-
nale toward law enforcement interests rather than a concern for suspects,
it has consistently reasoned that objective tests are necessary to effec-
tively guide courts and police in the admissibility of confessions and has
rejected subjective multi-factored tests.281 These decisions represent a
marked contrast to the approach lower courts have taken in the immigra-
tion context.
273. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
274. Kamisar, Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case, supra note 117, at 168.
275. Ogletree, supra note 241, at 1834 (quoting Schulhofer, supra note 258).
276. See id.
277. Hancock, supra note 254, at 2237.
278. See Schulhofer, supra note 258.
279. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
280. See Ogletree, supra note 242, at 1839-40.
281. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) (defining rigidity to be the
core virtue of Miranda because it "inform[s] police and prosecutors with specificity as to
what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and inform[s] courts under what




Because Miranda is designed to guard against the inherently compel-
ling pressures of compulsive interrogation, Miranda rights attach only
when a person is in custody or deprived of her freedom of action in any
significant way. 2 82 The Supreme Court has long held that this test is eval-
uated by two levels of objective criteria: first, an objective determination
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and second, whether
a "reasonable person" would have felt she was free to leave. 2 83 Since Mi-
randa was decided, the Court has continued to explicitly reject the use of
subjective factors in this analysis, making clear that the question of cus-
tody "depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, [and]
not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers
or the person being questioned." 2 84 In recent decisions, the Court has
taken great care to focus on objective criteria in analyzing custody to pro-
mote ease of administrability for police and judges, fairness to the suspect
and police, and stability in the law.2 8 5
In the 1990s, the Court in Stansbury v. California286 explicitly rejected
analyzing the subjective intent of law enforcement officers on the ground
that it would create the irrational situation of forcing suspects to "probe
the officer's innermost thoughts."287 Because the inquiry focuses on how
a reasonable person would perceive her circumstances, the Court empha-
sized that "an officer's evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect
the objective circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus
cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry." 288 In Thompson v. Keo-
hane,289 the Court held that judges should make the determination of
whether a suspect is in custody to advance uniformity and consistency,
observing that the "law declaration aspect of independent review poten-
tially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law."290
Recently, in Howes v. Fields,291 the Court reaffirmed that the custody
determination also requires an objective analysis of the suspect's and of-
ficer's perspectives. In Howe, the Court examined whether a suspect was
in custody when he was questioned after he was escorted from his prison
cell to a conference room by sheriff's deputies, he was told he was free to
282. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (holding Miranda
warnings attach "only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to
render him 'in custody"'); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990).
283. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
284. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1994).
285. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 562, 668-69 (2004).
286. 511 U.S. 318, 324-26 (1994).
287. Id. at 324-25.
288. Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435 n.22 (1984)).
289. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
290. Id. at 115 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436-39 (1984)); Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 273-76 (1985) (stating that "norm elaboration occurs
best when the Court has power to consider fully a series of closely related situations"; case-
by-case elaboration, when a constitutional right is implicated, may more accurately be de-
scribed as law declaration than as law application).
291. 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012).
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leave, he remained unrestrained, and the door to the conference room
remained open.2 9 2 The Court held that the inquiry involved analyzing
whether, under "the objective circumstances of the interrogation," a "rea-
sonable person" would have felt free to leave.2 9 3 Analyzing the general
perspective of a suspect in his position, the Court concluded that the ob-
jective facts of the interview were "consistent with an interrogation envi-
ronment in which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate
the interview and leave." 294
In 2011, the Court again underscored the salience and rationale of an
objective approach to determining custody in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.295
In J.D.B., the Court considered whether a 13-year-old student was in cus-
tody when a uniformed police officer took him from his classroom to a
closed-door school conference room and, with school administrators pre-
sent, questioned him about a theft for thirty minutes without providing
him with Miranda warnings. 296 The student was criminally charged based
on statements he made during the interrogation.297 Noting that the Court
has "repeatedly emphasized [that] whether a suspect is 'in custody' is an
objective inquiry," 298 the court held that a child's age is an objective fac-
tor relevant to the custody analysis so long as her age was known to the
officer or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.
The J.D.B. Court was careful to define age as an objective criterion based
on scientific evidence and its recent precedent to provide clear guidance
to the police, who make "in-the-moment judgments as to when to admin-
ister Miranda warnings." 299 Limiting the analysis to objective criteria and
a "reasonable person" standard, the Court held, "avoids burdening police
with the task of anticipating the idiosyncrasies of every individual suspect
and divining how those particular traits affect each person's subjective
state of mind."300
While custody focuses on a separate, albeit interrelated, aspect of Mi-
randa jurisprudence, the Court's focus on objective criteria to provide
clarity for police, uniform precedent, and stability in the law is equally
applicable to the concerns raised by the varying tests lower courts have
developed for immigrants in the Miranda context. Most courts in the im-
migration context focus specifically on the actual suspicions and knowl-
edge of the agent, without regard to uniformity; the right to Miranda
warnings in dual criminal and civil immigration interrogations now turns
primarily on jurisdiction.301 The failure of courts to provide consistent,
objective factors for this inquiry has resulted in unworkable rules and
292. See id. at 1186.
293. Id. at 1189.
294. Id. at 1193 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664-65 (2004)).
295. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398-400 (2011).
296. Id. at 2399-400.
297. Id. at 2400.
298. Id. at 2402.
299. Id. at 2402.
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., Mantejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
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confusion for law enforcement agents and courts, and leaves immigrants
vulnerable to abuse.
b. Waiver
Under Miranda, a knowing and intelligent waiver is a condition prece-
dent to interrogation; a suspect must be read his Miranda rights, and must
waive them, before interrogation can begin 302 Once a suspect has in-
voked her rights unambiguously, all questioning must cease. This "rigid
requirement" in Miranda has "the virtue of informing police and prosecu-
tors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial inter-
rogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements
obtained during such interrogation are not admissible."30 3 While the
Court has made inroads into the definition of a valid waiver in recent
years, it has continued to emphasize the need for clear rules to guide this
inquiry.304
For example, in February 2010, in Maryland v. Shatzer,305 the Court
held that a fourteen-day break in custody ends the Edwards v. Arizona306
presumption that statements made by suspects after invoking their right
to counsel are involuntary. In Shatzer, the Court addressed a case where
law enforcement agents questioned a suspect held on separate state
charges without counsel two years after he had invoked his right to coun-
sel in a previous interrogation. 307 In the second interview, the suspect
waived his right to counsel and made incriminating statements, which
were subsequently used to obtain a conviction against him.308 The Court
held that his statements were admissible and set a new rule that the pre-
sumption of involuntariness under Edwards lasts for only fourteen days,
reasoning that two weeks provided "plenty of time for the suspect to get
acclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to
shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody." 309 In estab-
lishing the fourteen-day rule, the Court rejected a fact-specific inquiry in
order to provide clear rules to law enforcement officers, observing that
"[i]t is impractical to leave the answer to that question for clarification in
future case-by-case adjudication; law enforcement officers need to know,
with certainty and beforehand, when renewed interrogation is lawful." 310
In 2010, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 11 the Court similarly adopted a
302. Miranda v. Arizona, 354 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) ("After ... warnings have been
given, and such opportunity [to invoke the Miranda rights] afforded ... the [suspect] may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a
statement.").
303. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
304. See, e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219-24 (2010).
305. Id. at 1227.
306. See 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
307. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217-18.
308. Id. at 1218.
309. Id. at 1223.
310. Id. at 1222-23.
311. 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010).
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new bright line in the waiver context by requiring that a suspect who
wishes to invoke her right to be silent make a statement that indicates a
clear and unambiguous waiver. The Court rejected the previous fact-spe-
cific inquiry in favor of a clear rule requiring an unambiguous invocation
of the right to silence.312 The Court relied on its previous decision in Da-
vis v. United States, 313 which similarly held that a suspect must clearly
invoke her right to counsel during an interrogation for it to be valid under
Miranda. In Berghuis, the Court reasoned that the old rule that allowed a
waiver through an "ambiguous act, omission, or statement," would re-
quire police "to make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear in-
tent."314 By contrast, the Court held that an unambiguous waiver aids
courts and law enforcement because it "'avoid[s] difficulties of proof
and . . . provide[s] guidance to officers on how to precede in the face of
ambiguity" 315 and it avoids requiring police to engage in a guessing
game.
The Court's concerns for clarity in the waiver context, like the objec-
tive approach to custody rules, run counter to the emerging law about
Miranda rights in dual civil and criminal immigration interrogations. The
updated Miranda-Edward waiver rights also highlight an important issue
regarding the Miranda safeguards in dual civil and criminal immigration
context: the Court's rule requires that if a suspect asserts his right to
counsel or silence, not only must the current interrogation cease, but the
suspect may not be approached for further interrogation "until counsel
has been made available to him." 316 These rules apply to any subsequent
officer; knowledge about a suspect's invocation of counsel is imputed to
any subsequent official who interrogates the suspect, as every official is
required to respect any invocation.317 If Courts are inconsistent in
whether Miranda applies, it sends a mixed message to law enforcement
officials about whether they are required to ascertain and respect the
rights of an inmate who has invoked the right to counsel or to remain
silent when questioned about immigration status.318 With the current in-
consistencies, immigrants' protections under the Miranda-Edwards rules
are at risk.
312. Id.
313. 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994).
314. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260.
315. Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).
316. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
317. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1988) (suppressing statements suspect
made in second interrogation about separate crime without counsel following his invoca-
tion of his right to counsel in initial interrogation where second officer was unaware that
suspect had invoked his right to counsel).
318. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966)) ("Beyond this duty to inform, Miranda requires that the police respect the
accused's decision to exercise the rights outlined in the warnings. 'If the individual indi-
cates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, [or if he] states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease."').
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3. Eliminating the Right and the Centrality of Warnings
The strongest and most lasting import of the Court's decision in Mi-
randa is that warnings are required prior to custodial interrogation to en-
sure that suspects are not coerced into confessing and that fair notice is
given so that suspects can exercise their rights.319 Absent other fully ef-
fective procedures, police are required to provide the suspect four warn-
ings prior to any custodial questioning: she has the right to remain silent,
anything she says can be used against her in a court of law; she has the
right to the presence of an attorney; and if she cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for her prior to any questioning if she so desires. 320
Since Miranda, the Court has underscored the centrality of warnings as
the core protection in custodial interrogation that maintains clarity and
protects suspects' Fifth Amendment rights.321 By not mandating warnings
in the immigration context or conditioning them on subjective factors,
lower courts are undermining a fundamental protection designed to pro-
tect individuals from police overreaching.
The Miranda warnings are designed to counteract the coercive pres-
sures inherent 322 in custodial interrogation and to give individuals some
measure of control by providing information about their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights.323 The warnings ensure that a suspect's decision to
submit to custodial interrogation is an intentional relinquishment of
known rights to silence and to counsel, and to inform her that she is not
obliged to participate in an interrogation that can incriminate her, and
make her aware that she may waive her rights.324 Thus, Miranda warnings
allow suspects the "right to choose between silence and speech . . .
throughout the interrogation process." 325 Warnings are also intended "to
make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of
the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting
solely in his interests." 326 The "per se" rules in Miranda requiring warn-
ings and requiring that interrogation cease once a suspect invokes his
right to an attorney are also "based on [the Supreme] Court's perception
that the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of
his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client un-
319. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434-35 (1984); U.S. v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264, 273-74 (1980).
320. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
321. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 434-35.
322. Miranda and its progeny accept as a basic premise that "the compelling influence
of the interrogation" could eventually "force[ ]" a suspect to make a statement even if he
never intended "voluntary relinquishment of the privilege." Id. at 476.
323. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
324. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) ("[Miranda's] fundamen-
tal purpose [is] to assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence
remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process."); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 426 (1986) ("Miranda ... giv[es] the defendant the power to exert some control over
the . . . interrogation.").
325. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
326. Id.
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dergoing custodial interrogation." 3 2 7 As the Miranda Court recognized,
lawyers have a special role once a suspect "becomes enmeshed in the
adversary process."328 Indeed, the Court noted that "the right to have
counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of
the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system" 329 and "helps guard
against overreaching by the police." 330 While this mechanism does not
per se eliminate coercion, it is the central safeguard that ensures a suspect
has made his own assessment of the risks and benefits of submitting to a
custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel.
Whether expanding or limiting the rights of suspects, the right to warn-
ings has been the most persistent legacy of the Court's decision partly
because of the clarity of its rule.33 ' In Berkemer v. McCarty,332 the Court
relied on this principle to unanimously invalidate a state law allowing a
misdemeanor exception to Miranda because it would result in "byzan-
tine" unclear rules and "doctrinal complexities," which the Supreme
Court sought to avoid in deciding Miranda.333 The Court also reasoned
that a misdemeanor exception "would substantially undermine th[e] cru-
cial advantage" 334 of the "clarity" of the Miranda warnings, because it is
unreasonable to expect "police to make guesses as to the nature of the
criminal conduct at issue before deciding how they may interrogate the
suspect."335 And by invalidating state law in Berghuis, the Court ob-
served that allowing a suspect to invoke his right to silence by a more
equivocal act may "add marginally to Miranda's goal of dispelling the
compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation," but found its less-protec-
tive ruling was appropriate because "as Miranda holds, full comprehen-
sion of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney are sufficient to
dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process."336
The centrality of warnings has been reflected in the Court's recent deci-
sions. In upholding the constitutional underpinnings of Miranda in Dick-
erson v. United States337 in 2000, the Court made clear that a principal
purpose of the Miranda warnings is to permit the suspect to make an
intelligent decision about whether to answer a government agent's ques-
tions.338 There the Court recognized that the Miranda warnings have "be-
327. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
328. Id.
329. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
330. Fare, 442 U.S. at 719.
331. See, e.g., id.; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1954) ("One of the principal
advantages of the [Miranda] doctrine that suspects must be given warnings before being
interrogated while in custody is the clarity of that rule.").
332. 468 U.S. at 430.
333. Id. at 431.
334. Id. at 430.
335. Id. at 431.
336. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).
337. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
338. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (stating that "the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be
fully honored"); see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that the Miranda Court was concerned with interrogation tactics that would
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come embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture." 339 And in 2001, the
Court emphasized in Texas v. Cobb340 that " there can be no doubt that a
suspect must be apprised of his rights against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion and to consult with an attorney before authorities may conduct cus-
todial interrogation." 3 4 1 Thus, while the warnings do not require police,
to disclose all of the information that a person might want before choos-
ing between speech and silence,342 nor do they require police to be pre-
cise, 343 the Court has consistently held that without warnings no waiver of
the privilege can be deemed informed.344
Lower court decisions in the dual civil and criminal immigration con-
text depart from the Court's consistent rule that warnings remain central
for suspects in an adversarial setting to understand their rights. Without
warnings, suspects have no knowledge that they are being asked a ques-
tion that could incriminate them and are unable to make an intelligent or
informed decision regarding how to answer a government agent's ques-
tions, which is a prerequisite to the rights safeguarded under Miranda.345
The absence of warnings denies individuals the benefit of the important
purpose of Miranda warnings: "to make the individual more acutely
aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is
not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interests." 346 When po-
lice and jail officials ask inmates about their nationality or immigration
status, they do so for the express purpose of referring the inmate to ICE,
which, as described below, can and frequently does result in criminal
prosecutions related to violations of immigration laws. Nationality, immi-
gration status, and place of birth all have a direct bearing on potential
federal prosecution for immigration crimes. Given the broad scale and
systematic levels of criminal prosecutions for immigration crimes, as dis-
cussed in the next section, courts' analyses that the answers to such ques-
tions are not "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response," 347 or
that officers obtain a "knowing and voluntary" 348 waiver of these rights,
is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny.
The new exceptionalism in immigrants' Miranda rights has implications
for immigrants in the criminal context beyond the Fifth Amendment. This
was most recently reflected by the Court's 2009 decision in Montejo v.
"disable [an individual] from making a free and rational choice" when deciding whether to
speak to the police during an interrogation (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-65)).
339. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
340. 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
341. Id. at 171.
342. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-77 (1987) (holding that officers do
not have to divulge the subject matter of the interrogation).
343. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989).
344. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-72 (1966).
345. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981).
346. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
347. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
348. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
322 [Vol. 66
The Immigrant and Miranda
Louisiana,349 which made Miranda warnings and waivers relevant to the
application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceed-
ings. The transformation of Miranda rules for immigrants in the criminal
context marks a new inroad into an already-weakened Miranda jurispru-
dence that risks eroding mechanisms the Court has left intact in Miranda
and undermines the balance the Court has achieved to protect against
coerced confessions. Courts are developing an entirely distinct jurispru-
dence for immigrants at odds with fundamental principles established in
Miranda that threatens to back-pedal to an era of judicial inconsistency
and confusion among courts, institutional actors, and suspects alike.
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR NONCITIZENS, LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND IMMIGRANT PROTECTIONS
As described above, Miranda represented an attempt by the Court to
protect individual rights by "providing guidance to primary actors (law
enforcement personnel) in terms" that were "sufficiently specific" to gen-
erate "self applying regulation." 3 5 0 By departing from well-established
Miranda principles for immigrants, courts are compounding institutional
structures that are incentivizing these primary actors to deprive nonci-
tizen suspects of their criminal procedural protections on a broad scale.
This section describes two trends that exacerbate the confusion among
lower courts. First, there has been an unprecedented increase in federal
prosecution of immigration crimes.351 Second, while local law enforce-
ment officials are authorized, but are not required, to arrest and detain
persons suspected of violating the criminal provisions of federal immigra-
tion law, they have been doing so recently in record numbers. Untrained
local law enforcement serve as the new front line in criminal and civil
immigration enforcement. The federal government has institutionalized
this arrangement by providing substantial financial incentives for local
law enforcement to identify criminal aliens subject to dual civil and crimi-
nal penalties; almost every jurisdiction in the country participates in crim-
inal and civil immigration interrogations of individuals for purposes of
identifying and referring "criminal aliens" to ICE for prosecution and
deportation.
A. UNPRECEDENTED CHANGES IN CRIMINAL
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Historically, the federal government has not used criminal provisions
of the INA in its immigration enforcement efforts. 352 In 1972, scholars
noted the "de minimis policy" of U.S. criminal immigration enforcement,
349. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 789-92 (2009).
350. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1975).
351. See Sklansky, supra note 31, at 166-167.
352. Robert L. Robin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1057 (1972).
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which was characterized by a period when U.S. Attorneys would "prose-
cute smugglers, but not the illegal entrants themselves."35 3 However, the
number of federal prosecutions of immigration crimes has grown signifi-
cantly since the 1980s.3 5 4 In addition, since the 1980s, Congress has in-
creased the number and scope of immigration-related crimes, and in the
1990s, Congress increased the penalties for immigration crimes. 35 5
Since Congress began expanding the scope and penalties of criminal
provisions in the INA, federal prosecution of immigration-related crimes
has grown significantly. 356 However, it is only since 2005 that the govern-
ment has sharply increased its focus on criminally prosecuting immigrants
for immigration violations.357 Beginning with the Bush Administration in
2005, federal immigration-related prosecutions spiked, and are now at re-
cord highs.358 By 2008, President Bush's last year in office, federal prose-
cution of immigration crimes had doubled over the previous year to more
than 70,000 prosecutions, and has continued to rise with the Obama ad-
ministration through 2011.359 In all, from 1997 to 2009, immigration pros-
ecutions grew more than ten-fold.360
Today, more than half of the federal docket is now comprised of prose-
cutions for immigration-related crimes, with 54% of all federal criminal
cases ending in convictions, up from 24% of all federal convictions in
2007 and just 7% in 1991.361 While federal immigration prosecutions de-
clined slightly in 2010, the most recent data available indicate that immi-
gration prosecutions accounted for 59% of all federal criminal charges in
353. Regarding immigration offenses, where the major violation is illegal entry into the
country, a de minimus policy of prosecuting only repeat violators is used in combination
with the administrative remedy of deportation to help keep the caseload within managea-
ble proportions. Id.
354. Helen Morris, Zero Tolerance: The Increasing Criminalization of Immigration
Law, 74 No. 33 Interpreter Releases 1317, 1317-18 (1997).
355. Chac6n, supra note 29, at 137 ("Since the 1980s, Congress has passed legislation
subjecting more and more acts associated with migration to criminal penalties, or increas-
ing the severity of criminal sanctions imposed for the commission of those acts."); Stumpf,
supra note 23, at 376.
356. Morris, supra note 354, at 1318.
357. Sklansky, supra note 31, at 177-78.
358. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2088, 2094
(2008) ("Starting around 2005, federal prosecutors have prosecuted immigration-related
crimes more frequently, to the point that immigration-related prosecutions accounted in
February 2008 for the majority of new federal criminal cases."). From August 2003 to Au-
gust 2009, the number of immigration-related prosecutions went up by five times. Id.
359. TRAC Immigration, Immigration Prosecution at Record Levels in FY 2009 (2009),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/218.
360. Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics Program-Immigration Offenders in the
Federal Justice System (2012), 8-10, July 2012, http:/Ibjs.ojp.wdoj.gov/index.cfm?Fy+
pbdetail+iid=4392 (last visited Nov. 8, 2012); see also, Sklansky, supra note 31, at 223.
361. TRAC Reports, FY 2009 Federal Prosecutions Sharply Higher (2009), http://trac.
syr.edu/tracreports/crim/223/; TRAC Immigration, Immigration Prosecutions at Record
Levels in FY2009, supra note 359. Notably, the prosecution of almost all other major crime
categories, including crimes involving drugs, weapons, and white-collar crime, increased
only slightly or in some cases actually declined. See supra TRAC Reports; Daphne Eviatar,
Sharp Rise in Immigration Filings Drives Criminal Prosecution Stats, WASH. INDEP. (Dec.
21, 2009).
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April 2012.362 Last year, the federal government filed 89,000 criminal im-
migration charges, an average of 7,088 a month.363
The overlap between civil and criminal immigration enforcement is
substantial.36 The most commonly prosecuted immigration crimes are
those for which immigrants can also be deported: improper entry; illegal
reentry after a removal order; and felony reentry, which carries a sen-
tence of up to twenty years if a previous conviction was for an aggravated
felony. In 2011, improper reentry was the most frequently recorded lead
charge. 365 In total, more than 90% of all immigration convictions, or
72,000 individuals, were convicted of illegal entry or reentry-more pros-
ecutions than all other federal crimes combined.366
As a result, the likelihood that an immigrant who has a status-related
issue will be criminally prosecuted has increased sharply. In 2011, for ex-
ample, around twenty percent of all apprehensions by the Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP) resulted in a criminal immigration prosecution-up
from 2% in 2006.367 During this same period, the total number of CBP
apprehensions fell by more than half, while CBP-referred criminal prose-
cutions tripled.3 68 Immigrants are now more likely than ever to face crim-
inal charges.
This unprecedented increase in criminal immigration prosecutions has
been due in part to "zero tolerance" programs adopted under the Bush
administration designed to criminally prosecute all apprehended undocu-
mented immigrants in the southwest border area. 369 To implement this
strategy, in about 2004 DHS directed and provided funds to federal and
local agencies through a program called "Operation Streamline." 37 0
Streamline has involved expedited and consolidated processing of illegal
entry and reentry cases, which has resulted in mass criminal proceedings
and guilty pleas. In some jurisdictions, this federal mass-prosecution pro-
gram has resulted in fifty to one hundred defendants being prosecuted for
illegal entry every single day. 3 71 As a result, between 2002 and 2008, pros-
ecutions for first-time illegal entry in border district courts increased
330% 372
The rapid growth in federal immigration prosecutions has also resulted
from increased law enforcement efforts away from the southwest border.
In his rich analysis of criminal immigration enforcement, Professor David
362. TRAC Immigration, supra note 195; TRAC, Federal Prosecution Data for April
2012 Released (July 9, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/whatsnew/email.120709.html.
363. . Eagly, supra note 31, at 1294; Lydgate, supra note 19, at 511.
364. See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 194, at 599-600.
365. TRAC Immigration, supra note 203.
366. GRASSROOTs LEADERSHIP, supra note 203, at 3; TRAC Immigration, supra note
203.
367. TRAC Immigration, supra note 195.
368. Id.
369. GRASSROOTs LEADERSHIP, supra note 203, at 4.
370. Id.; Chac6n, supra note 31, at 142-43.




Alan Sklansky found that a quarter of all federal prosecutions in Arkan-
sas, Idaho, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington, Ver-
mont, are immigration cases. 373 From 2007 to 2010, criminal immigration
prosecutions in non-border states increased by 31%.374
The rise in prosecutions of federal immigration crimes has led scholars
to voice significant concerns that the government has entered into a new
era of using criminal law to regulate immigration, similar to the concerns
raised in the emerging Miranda jurisprudence for immigrants.375 While
immigration and criminal law have long operated as separate systems,
their convergence has resulted in the disruption of the rule of law for
immigrants and the disruption of a unitary criminal justice system. 376 The
federal government has been able to borrow law enforcement tools from
the civil system in an ad hoc manner, despite the fact that the immigra-
tion system operates with different objectives and under different consti-
tutional rules. 3 7 7 The ability of the government to choose between civil or
criminal laws has resulted in the absence of accountability and ultimately
in an unequal criminal justice system for immigrants. On the ground, the
convergence of immigration and criminal law enforcement has resulted in
reports of systemic criminal procedural violations of immigrants' rights by
law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and judges, including mass guilty
pleas.378
Significantly, the growth in federally prosecuted crimes has also had a
disproportionate impact on Latino communities, which in 1991 accounted
for 24% of federal criminal convictions, compared to 40% in 2007.379
"Among those sentenced for immigration offenses in 2007, 80% were
Hispanic."380 According to the Pew Research Center, much of the in-
crease in the number of Hispanics sentenced in federal courts is the result
of the rise in the number of offenders sentenced for immigration offenses
between 1991 and 2007.381 Since 1991, "the number of sentenced offend-
ers who were Hispanic nearly quadrupled and accounted for more than
half (54%) of the growth in the total number of sentenced offenders." 382
In 2007, 75% of Latino offenders sentenced for immigration crimes were
convicted of entering the U.S. unlawfully or residing in the country with-
out authorization, and among sentenced noncitizen Latino immigration
offenders, more than 81% were convicted of entering unlawfully or resid-
373. Sklansky, supra note 31, at 167.
374. TRAC, Federal Criminal Enforcement and Staffing: How Do the Obama and Bush
Administrations Compare? (2011), http://trac.syr.edultracreports/crim/245/.
375. Eagly, supra note 31, at 1358.
376. Id. at 1285-1304.
377. Id. at 1288-89; Sklansky, supra note 31, at 167.
378. See, e.g., United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing
one particular mass plea agreement and noting that "in twelve months' time the court has
handled 25,000" of these pleas).
379. MARK LOPEZ & MICHAEL LIGHT, A RISING SHARE: HISPANICS AND FEDERAL
CRIME 1 (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/104.pdf.
380. Id.
381. Id. at ii.
382. Id.
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ing in the U.S. without authorization. 383
B. NEW ACTORS: DEVOLUTION OF POWER TO LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES THROUGH FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
There has been another significant shift in immigration regulation af-
fected by the emerging immigration exceptionalism in Miranda jurispru-
dence: the federal government's increased reliance on local law
enforcement to enforce both civil and criminal immigration laws. 3 M Prior
to September 11th, criminal and civil immigration laws were primarily
enforced by federal immigration officials trained in immigration law and
procedure, with limited assistance from local police.3 85 However, in the
last decade, the federal government has developed a number of programs
and has strengthened old ones to effectively enlist state and local actors
to be the front line of both civil and criminal immigration enforcement.
Scholars have provided thoughtful analysis to the scope and questions
raised by the state and local officials involved in civil immigration en-
forcement, but until recently, there has been less attention paid to the
role local law enforcement agents play in criminal immigration enforce-
ment.3 8 6 In this section, I describe the scope of changing federal institu-
tional structures that have incentivized and promoted the role of state
and local actors in criminal immigration enforcement by using new data
obtained from the Department of Justice and ICE. I then examine the
implication of these shifts in light of the doctrinal transformation of Mi-
randa for immigrants. As a result of these changes, almost every local law
enforcement agency in the nation is involved with criminal and civil im-
migration enforcement 387 through substantial financial incentives, total-
ing $2.85 billion dollars over the last three years.
The federal government has been simultaneously proactive in involving
local law enforcement officials in immigration enforcement and deeply
critical of and aggressive in challenging the involvement of local actors in
immigration enforcement. On the one hand, the U.S. government re-
cently filed suit against Arizona and five other states that passed state
immigration laws, arguing that local law enforcement was preempted be-
cause increasing local enforcement of immigration would distort and un-
383. Id.
384. See, e.g., Kalhan, supra note 23, at 1161-63; Wishnie, supra note 23, at 1084-88.
385. Wishie, supra note 23, at 1085-87. The power to regulate admission, exclusion, and
removal (deportation) lies exclusively with the federal government. See DeCanas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
386. Professor Hiroshi Motomura recently broke new ground in this area by exploring
the allocation of authority between local and state police officials to make federal criminal
arrests and the broader implications for immigration enforcement. See Hiroshi Motomura,
The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests,
and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1848-49 (2011).
387. State and local government officials often work with the federal government to
assist criminal enforcement of immigration laws. See, e.g., Michael Van Cassell, Wyoming
Illegal Immigration Cases Triple, WYOMING TRIB. EAGLE, Feb. 14, 2010; Valerie Brown,
Cases of Illegal Re-entry after Deportation Still on the Rise in Oklahoma City Court, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 30, 2011.
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dermine federal immigration priorities and raise civil rights issues. At the
same time, since September 11th, the federal government has launched
numerous federal-local partnership programs to strengthen and leverage
ICE's enforcement capacity under a "force multiplier theory." 388 As Pro-
fessor Motomura has described, the federal government has effectively
conceded its authority and enforcement discretion to state and local ac-
tors.389 These programs, including Secure Communities, 287(g) partner-
ships, and the Criminal Alien Program have formally and informally put
local law enforcement officials on the front lines of civil and criminal im-
migration enforcement. 390
One such federal-state partnership that has both incentivized and con-
scripted local officials into criminal and civil immigration enforcement-
and is at the forefront of conducting dual civil and criminal custodial in-
terrogations about immigration status-is the little-known State Criminal
Alien Assistance Program ("SCAAP").391 Originally designed in 1994 to
provide federal funds to local jurisdictions to defray the cost of detaining
"undocumented criminal aliens," it has evolved into the central referral
tool for incorporating local law enforcement agencies into civil and crimi-
nal immigration enforcement. 392 The SCAAP program provides federal
funds to states and localities for detaining, identifying, and referring to
ICE certain "undocumented criminal aliens." 393 The authorizing statute
defines eligible aliens to include individuals who are expressly subject to
both criminal and civil immigration charges, i.e., undocumented individu-
als who entered the U.S. without inspection or who failed to maintain
their immigration status.394 Notably, SCAAP does not compensate local
agencies for detaining individuals for federal immigration charges, but
rather for all the pre-trial and post-conviction time that eligible inmates
serve on their state criminal sentences-detention costs that local agencies
would normally pay for inmates, regardless of immigration status.395
388. MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERV., INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL
ALIENS 27 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42057.pdf ("[B]ecause
there are about 150 times more state and local law enforcement officers in the United
States . . . any policies that gorge connections between state and local law enforcement
agents and ICE have the potential to increase ICE's presence in U.S. communities and
may be substantial force multipliers for ICE.").
389. Motomura, supra note 31, at 1845, 1851.
390. Id. at 1850, 1855; Wishnie, supra note 23, at 1084-88.
391. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, FY 2011 SCAPP GUIDELINES AND APPLICA-
TION 1 (2011), available at https://www.bja.gov/Funding/11SCAAP Guidelines.pdf.
392. The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program was created by the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1823-24
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i) (2006)); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
supra note 391, at 1-2.
393. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i) (2006).
394. Id.; Bureau of Justice Assistance, State Criminal Alien Assistance Program
(SCAAP), http://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=86 (last visited June 8,
2013). SCAAP also requires that eligible aliens are (1) convicted of a felony or two misde-
meanors, and (2) detained four or more consecutive days. Id.
395. Until last year, BJA also reimbursed jurisdictions for incarcerating "unknown"
criminal aliens. Id.
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Participation in SCAAP is conditioned on local law enforcement offi-
cials using "due diligence" to identify and report eligible undocumented
individuals to ICE for processing.396 Once ICE receives information from
local agencies, it categorizes inmates into three categories: SCAAP eligi-
ble; unknown; or not eligible, meaning the individual is a U.S. citizen or
legal resident. 397 The DOJ then reimburses the agency for correctional
officer costs associated with all pre-trial and post-conviction time served
incarcerating all SCAAP-eligible inmates on a per diem rate. 3 9 8
By conditioning funding on identifying immigrants who could be sub-
ject to civil or criminal violations, SCAAP has effectively delegated front-
line authority to local actors to interrogate suspects for information that
can be used for both criminal and civil prosecutions. The inclusion of fed-
eral crimes involving illegal entry ensures that some of the eligible indi-
viduals referred to ICE through SCAAP are at risk of facing civil and
criminal penalties; as described Part III.A, illegal entry and reentry are
currently the highest recorded federal criminal charges. 399 While SCAAP
was enacted to be a "reimbursement program," as government officials
have acknowledged, it operates as one of the largest enforcement mecha-
nisms to identify criminal aliens.400
A review of government reports and SCAAP data obtained through
FOIA reveals several trends relevant to local criminal immigration en-
forcement and the emerging Miranda jurisprudence. First, the scope of
local participation and federal investment in this program is substantial.
According to an audit by the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice (OIG), the rate of local agencies participating in SCAAP appears
to be 100%.401 This is a substantial increase from the 1990s, when a 1997
Government Accounting Office (GAO) study indicated that INS-ICE's
396. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 391, at 2-3. To be reimbursed, state
and local agencies must provide "required information on undocumented criminal aliens,"
which includes the alien registration number, name, and the date of and country of birth.
Id. at 4.
397. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE STATE
CRIMINAL ALIEN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ASSESSMENT § 1.4 (2008), available at http://ge-
orgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10001096.2003.html. Accord-
ing to the OMB, "many of the 'unknowns' also are U.S. citizens or lawfully in the U.S." Id.
398. Until last year, BJA also reimbursed jurisdictions for incarcerating "unknown"
criminal aliens. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 391.
399. TRAC Immigration, supra note 203; Sklansky, supra note 31, at 167-68.
400. See, e.g., Jonathan Clark, Immigration Overhaul Bill Dead, So What is Next?,
DOUGLAS DISPATCH, July 5, 2007 (reporting County Sheriff is interested in more SCAAP
money, but "would prefer to focus on local problems like methamphetamine and domestic
abuse and leave border enforcement up to the federal government"); Chris Rizo, AG Criti-
cizes Obama over Proposed Budget Cuts, LEGAL NEWSLINE, May 8, 2009 (quoting Colo-
rado Attorney General John Suthers as stating: "The State Criminal Assistance Program is
one of the important ways the federal government helps states pay for enforcing federal
immigration law and incarcerating illegal immigrants."); Isaac Wolf, U.S. Program Pays
Municipalities to Identify Illegal Immigrants, SCRIPPS NEWS, July 30, 2010, http://www.
scrippsnews.com/node/55518.
401. DOJ, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIVISION, COOPERATION OF




predecessor-screened only one-third of foreign-born prisoners. 402 Simi-
larly, the number of agencies participating in the program has more than
doubled since September 11th, increasing from 412 local law enforcement
agencies in 2000 to 929 in 2011.403
Second, local law enforcement officials frequently directly question ar-
restees about their immigration status to comply with SCAAP, although
the circumstances and content of questioning varies. The OIG audit
found that a majority of the participating agencies comply with SCAAP
by directly asking arrestees about their immigration status.404 Other
agencies indicated that they asked suspects about their country of birth or
nationality, or only inquired about immigration status upon suspicion that
a detainee was undocumented or arrested for a felony. 405 Some agencies
reported that they interrogated suspects about their immigration status
upon arrest, while others indicated they interrogated the suspect during
booking.406 While almost all jurisdictions were "cooperative" with ICE, a
number of local agencies expressed discomfort with questioning individu-
als about their immigration status and enforcing immigration law,
prompting some to limit immigration-related inquiries as part of the jail
booking process. 407
Third, there has been a sharp increase in local SCAAP referrals to ICE
that tracks the increase in federal immigration prosecutions. Between
2005 and 2010, the number of SCAAP referrals increased by almost 30%,
from 270,807 to 350,197.408 During this same period, federal payments to
local jurisdictions for SCAAP referrals grew from $287 million in 2005 to
$324 million in 2010. In total, the federal government allocated $4.65 bil-
lion for SCAAP payments to local jurisdictions, 409 and local agencies
identified and referred 1.65 million arrestees to ICE in the last five
years.410
Data from ICE also confirms that local law enforcement agencies have
become involved in the immigration enforcement process at unprece-
dented rates during this period. The ICE Local Law Enforcement Center
(LESC), which is primarily used by "state and local law enforcement of-
402. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S.
Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. Soc. Pot'Y & L. 606, 662 n.242 (2011).
403. See DOJ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, FY 2011 SCAAP AWARDS, https://
www.bja.gov/Funding/11SCAAPAwards.xls; DOJ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
SCAAP AwARDS.00.01.02, https://www.bja.gov/Funding/SCAAP.Awards.00.01.02.xls.
404. DOJ, supra note 401, at 11.
405. Id. at vi, 11-12, 19.
406. Id. In Shelby County, TN, every inmate is interviewed about their immigration
status upon booking. See, e.g., Kristina Goetz, Shelby County Jail Screens Inmates' Immi-
gration Statuses, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/
2010/aug/01/jail-screens-inmates-statuses/.
407. DOJ, supra note 401, at 19.
408. See SCAAP AWARDS, supra note 27.
409. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i)(5)(A)-(C) (2006) (setting SCAAP appropriations at $750 mil-
lion for fiscal year 2006, $850 million for fiscal year 2007, and $950 million for fiscal years
2008-2011).
410. See SCAAP AWARDS, supra note 27.
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ficers seeking information about aliens encountered in the course of their
daily enforcement activities," reported receiving 1,278,219 electronic re-
quests for information in 2011, more than twice the number of inquiries it
received in 2004.411
Significantly, local law enforcement agencies have had a low accuracy
rate in referring eligible individuals to ICE for SCAAP reimbursement,
and has referred to ICE a substantial number of legal residents and U.S.
citizens. Only about one-third of the 1.8 million local agency referrals
made for SCAAP purposes from 2005 to 2010 were deemed to be
SCAAP-eligible.412 Despite federal rules instructing that U.S. citizens
should not be reported through SCAAP, 4 1 3 in the last five years local
actors referred close to 1.2 million individuals who were not verified to be
criminal aliens, including more than 300,000 U.S. citizens and legal per-
manent residents.4 14
Despite these errors, SCAAP and ICE statistics suggest that local
agencies are referring large numbers of individuals that could be subject
to civil or criminal violations through SCAAP. In the last five years, local
agencies referred more than 660,000 eligible criminal alien inmates to
ICE, a 60% increase from 2004 to 2011.415 A 2011 GAO Criminal Aliens
study found that 65% (or 161,850) of the 249,000 criminal aliens in a
study population comprised primarily of SCAAP-eligible detainees had
been previously arrested at least once for a criminal or civil immigration
offense prior to their referral.4 1 6 These figures suggest that a large num-
ber of individuals could be subject to an illegal entry or reentry
offense.417
411. ICE, Fact Sheet: Law Enforcement Support Center (May 29, 2012), http://www.ice.
gov/news/library/factsheets/lesc.htm. The LESC provides immigration status information
and assistance to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies on noncitizens sus-
pected, arrested or convicted of criminal activity. Id.; MICHAEL GARCIA, ASSISTANT SEC'Y
ICE, STATEMENT BEFORE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY 6 (2004), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/
speeches/garcia03O2O5.pdf.
412. See ANDORRA BRUNO ET AL., IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND ISSUES IN THE
112TH CONGREsS (2011).
413. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 391, at 2-3.
414. BRUNO ET AL, supra note 412.
415. See SCAAP AWARDS, supra note 27.
416. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRIMINAL ALIEN STATISTICS: INFORMA-
TION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COST 19 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11187.pdf. The study population was based on a random sample of 249,000
individuals, approximately 81% of whom were SCAAP-eligible inmates referred by local
law enforcement agencies to ICE from 2004 to 2008. Id. The remaining 19% were the
population of aliens incarcerated in federal prisons as of December 27, 2008. Even if the
entire sample of federal BOP prisoners fell into this category, 112,850, or 56% of the
SCAAP-referred individuals fell into this category. Id. at 50-52.
417. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325-26 (2006). While it is impossible to discern how many of the
660,599 eligible immigrants referred through SCAAP fell into either of the two categories
for compensation that subject SCAAP-eligible inmates to civil and criminal charges, the
GAO report suggests a high probability that many of them did. U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, supra note 416, at 19.
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Finally, data obtained from ICE confirm that state and local police
have been playing a growing role in criminal immigration enforcement
and comprising a bigger share of referrals. A recent analysis by Professor
Sklansky revealed that the share of criminal immigration cases resulting
from state and local referrals increased from 5.4% of all ICE criminal
cases to 10% by 2009. In total, more than 46,000 federal criminal immi-
gration cases resulted from state and local referrals last year.418 With lo-
cal actors increasingly contributing to the growth in criminal immigration
prosecutions and increasingly referring to ICE individuals subject to
criminal and civil immigration violations under SCAAP at record num-
bers, the government's "force multiplier" theory is being realized in the
criminal immigration context as well.
The court's emerging exceptionalism for immigrants is particularly seri-
ous given the widespread criminal and civil custodial interrogations re-
garding immigration status, which is compounded by the substantial
financial incentives local agencies receive for identifying and referring to
ICE individuals subject to criminal and civil immigration penalties. Local
law enforcement officials receive a considerable amount of money for
each day they detain a qualifying "criminal alien," creating strong incen-
tives to interrogate as many individuals as possible about their immigra-
tion status to maximize the number of qualifying aliens referred to
ICE.419 Government reports have criticized SCAAP for an absence of
accountability for how local agencies obtain immigration status informa-
tion and how jurisdictions use the money,420 and audits have confirmed
that local agencies have engaged in fraudulent reporting of inmates and
have referred a high number of U.S. citizens and legal residents to obtain
additional funds.421 Although there have been reports that SCAAP is in-
sufficient to cover costs for incarcerating criminal aliens in certain juris-
dictions, 422 there have been numerous reports of local agencies spending
SCAAP reimbursements to pay for costs wholly unrelated to detaining
"criminal aliens"; such costs include expanding general prison services
and programs, 423 covering local budget shortfalls, and even diverting
418. David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism [draft of
August, 18, 2011] (on file with author). Professor Sklansky shared the underlying docu-
ments he obtained from ICE through a FOIA in response to an email request. 11-FOIA-
2143, email from David Sklansky to author, Aug. 20, 2012 (email and documents on file
with author).
419. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 397, §§ 1-4.
420. Id.
421. Id.; CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR, STATE OF CALIFORNIA INTERNAL CONTROL
AND STATE AND FEDERAL COMPLIANCE AUDIT REPORT FOR THE FIsCAL YEAR ENDED
JUNE 30, 2011 65 (March 2012), available at http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2011-002.
pdf (reporting audit of California Department of Corrections submitted nearly 2,000 ineli-
gible inmate records for inmates with multiple registration numbers, and review of 29 sub-
mitted records revealed inmates were U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents).
422. Seth Hoy, Illinois County "Just Says No" to Costly Immigration Detainers, Immi-
gration Impact (Sept. 14, 2011), http://immigrationrationimpact.com/2011/09/14.
423. See, e.g., Steven Butler, Board Recognizes Sheriff Senator, CULPEPER STAR-ExPo-
NENT, Dec. 7, 2011 (SCAAP grant used to pay for contract nursing services); Gabriel
Khouli, NCSO, Juvenile Court to Help Troubled, CovNEws, Feb. 25, 2012 (life skills
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money for fraudulent personal use.4 2 4 The high level of fraudulent and
erroneous referrals and the misuse of SCAAP funds raises concerns that
local jurisdictions may disregard suspects' rights to maximize their finan-
cial gain from the program.
This year, ICE leveraged SCAAP to increase incentives for local agen-
cies to get involved in other immigration enforcement initiatives and pe-
nalize agencies that do not fall in line. ICE Director John Morton
threatened to withhold SCAAP funds from jurisdictions that refused to
collaborate in controversial enforcement efforts such as Secure Commu-
nities and immigration detainers, even though SCAAP does not cover
these costs. 4 25 Similarly, the DOJ modified SCAAP to provide funding
only for DHS-verified unauthorized aliens and exclude payment for "un-
verified inmates," which in past years have comprised up to 45% of all
referrals. 426 To maximize SCAAP funding levels, the DOJ has en-
couraged jurisdictions to participate more directly in immigration en-
forcement measures such as Secure Communities and 287(g). 427
The widespread involvement of untrained local and state police in im-
migration enforcement and considerable financial advantages of such ac-
tivity also heighten the risks that state and local law enforcement will
engage in unconstitutional policing.428 Scholars and leading police organi-
zations have leveled serious criticism about the expanding role of local
courses); Jeremy Redmon, Georgia Could Bear More of the Costs of Jailing Illegal Immi-
grants, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 8, 2012 (reporting that DeKalb County Sheriff used
SCAAP money "to pay for employee salaries and prevent furloughs amid a county funding
gap last year, replace doors in the county jail and pay for rehabilitation programs for in-
mates to prevent recidivism); Newton Detention Center Inmates Graduate From Self-Im-
provement Classes, NEWTON CITIZEN, June 11, 2012 (anger management classes); Kyle
Siegel, Security Cameras Coming to Pettis County Courthouse, SEDALIA NEWS J., June 13,
2012 (courthouse security cameras); Memorandum from Carlo Pacot, Budget and Policy
Analyst for Dallas County to Commissioners Court (Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.dallas-
county.org/department/comcrtlagenda/files/2008Aprl5b.pdf (hiring additional law enforce-
ment staff).
424. See, e.g., Brittany Wallman, Disgraced Sheriffs $1.6 Million Office Detailed, SUN
SENTINEL, June 5, 2011 (describing how Broward County Sheriff spent $1.6 million of
SCAAP funds for private office).
425. See, e.g., Rob Margetta, ICE Director Says '287(g)' Decision in Arizona was
Apolitical, Crackdown on 'Sanctuary' County Coming, CQ HOMELAND SECURITY, July 12,
2012 (ICE Director threatening to withhold SCAAP funds to Cook County for sanctuary
measures and refusal to participate in Secure Communities); NATIONAL IMMIGRATION
PROJECT, THE ALL-IN-ONE GUIDE To DEFEATING ICE HOTEL REQUESTS, app. 4 at 1-2
(2012), available at http://nationalimmigrationproject.org/community/All%20in%200ne
%20Guide%20Appendix%204.pdf.
426. BRUNO ET AL., supra note 412; see, e.g., DOJ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
FY 2008 SCAAP AWARDS (2008).
427. BRUNO ET AL., supra note 412, at 13.
428. See, e.g., Chac6n, supra note 29, at 1618 ("[R]acial profiling . .. has a long history
of surfacing when local law enforcement becomes engaged in immigration enforcement.").
Several states have called local officials to identify more "criminal aliens" to obtain addi-
tional SCAAP funding with local budget cuts. See, e.g., JOSEPH BILLY ET. AL., FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE CORRECTIONS AND HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE 8 (2010), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/reports/Corrections%20&%20Homeland%20
Security.pdf (recommending that local officials "redouble their efforts to identify and re-
cord foreign nationals," because payments "are below expected levels").
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police in prosecuting federal immigration crimes because immigration en-
forcement is both highly complex and distinct from their primary du-
ties.4 2 9 Local officials lack the knowledge, experience, and training in
immigration law on how to detect criminal or civil violations of federal
immigration laws, and on immigrants' procedural protections, compared
to the intensive training federal immigration agents receive that is neces-
sary to protect civil rights.4 3 0 Studies have found that even unfunded fed-
eral programs incorporating untrained local police into immigration
enforcement have a track record of increased racial profiling.431 For ex-
ample, when ICE introduced the Criminal Alien Program in Irving,
Texas, which placed ICE officials in the local jail but provided no finan-
cial benefit to the local agency, there was a marked rise in low-level crimi-
nal arrests of Hispanics. 432 In this sense, these institutional arrangements
and structural shifts effectively serve to normalize the effect of emerging
doctrinal exceptionalism and the absence of clarity in Miranda jurispru-
dence for immigrants.
With courts inconsistently protecting immigrants' Miranda rights with
the creation of vague and unworkable rules, there is no guidance for po-
lice operating in complicated terrain, and in many jurisdictions there is no
disadvantage for local officials to not provide Miranda warnings. By con-
ditioning the warnings on an officer's stated intent, courts are giving of-
ficers an easy way to circumvent the warnings. The current law creates a
tenuous dynamic that allows local actors to not respect immigrants' Mi-
randa rights during custodial interrogations about immigration status for
criminal and civil purposes. As a result, the hundreds of thousands of
suspects that are questioned about their immigration status for civil and
criminal purposes under SCAAP each year are at risk of not knowing
that they have the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney, and
429. See, e.g., Gene Voegtlin, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE,
TRIBAL, AND LOCAL LAw ENFORCEMENT, INT'L Assoc. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE (2004),
available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Publications/ImmigrationEnforcement-
conf.pdf ("Whether or not a person is in fact remaining in the country in violation of fed-
eral civil regulations or criminal provisions is a determination best left to these agencies
and the courts designed specifically to apply these laws and make such determinations
after appropriate hearings and procedures. The local patrol officer is not in the best posi-
tion to make these complex legal determinations.").
430. Id.
431. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div.,
DOJ, to Bill Montgomery, Maricopa Cnty. Att'y, Arizona 11 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso-findletter 12-15-11.pdf. (finding
widespread racial profiling by the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office that targeted people
who spoke Spanish or had "dark skin"); Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coali-
tion, Citations/Warrants for No Driver's License by Ethnicity and Race: Comparing the
Year Prior to 287(g) and the Year Following 287(g) (2008), http://www.tnimmigrant.org/
storage/misc/NoDriversLicensej1-yearoverview%206-2008.pdf (noting a statistically
significant increase in arrests of Latinos for driving without a license after implementation
of 287(g) program).
432. See, e.g., TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARRANT
INSTITUTE ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSr-Y, THE C.A.P. EFFECr: RACIAL PROFILING IN
TiE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1, 5, 8 (2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.
edulfiles/policybrief irvingFINAL.pdf.
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that they are in an adversarial position, utterly deprived of the choices
that Miranda sought to secure. The absence of clarity, combined with the
pressures for funding, also opens the door for direct coercion by local
officials. According to Morris County Jail officials, individuals who re-
main silent in response to SCAAP referral questioning are placed into
isolation until they respond.433
These doctrinal and institutional shifts have implications for all individ-
uals in the criminal justice system, regardless of alienage. 434 As the
SCAAP data indicates, placing local officials on the front line of immigra-
tion enforcement has resulted in a large number of errors in the identifi-
cation of criminal aliens, with local agencies misidentifying upwards of
300,000 individuals referred to ICE in the last few years.435 There have
also been documented reports of inaccurate referrals to ICE through
SCAAP that have resulted in U.S. citizens enduring prolonged immigra-
tion detention and removal proceedings. 436
With these institutional agreements and incentivizing structures, courts,
instead of providing guidance to the vast number of law enforcement offi-
cials conducting custodial interrogations about immigration status, are
causing more confusion along a critical terrain, with serious and wide-
spread consequences.
V. PROPOSALS
Given that the Court's post-Miranda decisions have largely signaled a
reluctance to further regulate police questioning, with some notable ex-
ceptions, it is important for the federal government to step in to align
immigration questioning with the constitutional protections long afforded
to immigrants. Lower courts have expended significant resources to ad-
dress this issue but have provided no guideposts to law enforcement offi-
cials for applying Miranda warnings in dual civil and criminal inquiries.
The problem with judicial confusion is that there are no clear lines to
guide police conduct in dual immigration inquiries. On a practical level,
with the federal government providing local officials financial incentives
for referring and detaining individuals subject to civil and criminal penal-
ties, there is intense pressure for local law enforcement officials to err on
the side of questioning individuals about their immigration status without
appropriate procedural protections.
The federal government has several options to address this problem.
First, the Department of Homeland Security should uniformly and ex-
pressly classify questioning of incarcerated individuals about their immi-
433. Undersheriff Interview, supra note 10.
434. Nationally, about 70 percent of immigrants are legal permanent residents or
American citizens. Nancy Morawetz & Alina Das, Legal Issues in Local Police Enforce-
ment of Federal Immigration Law, in THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A BALANCE
BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 72 (Police Foundation Con-
ference, Washington, DC, Aug. 21, 2008).
435. SCAAP AWARDS, supra note 27.
436. Stevens, supra note 402, at 663-74.
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gration status as a custodial interrogation with criminal consequences in
its federal-local partnerships, such as the SCAAP and 287(g) programs.
Local law enforcement agents, therefore, would be on notice that they
are required to inform suspects that any information they provide as part
of the investigation may later be used against them in criminal
proceedings.
Furthermore, the way in which local law enforcement officials identify
nationality and immigration status must be lawful and proceeded by a
Miranda warning. Before asking questions for purposes of ICE referral,
local officials who ask ICE referral questions should also be required to
determine whether individuals have invoked their right to counsel or si-
lence. The SCAAP program has proliferated to unprecedented propor-
tions. A critical response to immigration inquiries is to provide Miranda
warnings, on intake forms at jails if the person in custody may be ques-
tioned about immigration status. Miranda warnings should be implicated
during immigration questioning because a noncitizen should be granted
the right to understand the consequences that would ensue in both the
immigration and criminal justice systems if he lists a place of birth on an
intake form.
Promulgating such rules would promote uniformity within the adminis-
tration of these programs and create a solution that satisfies the various
tests used by lower courts. Such a solution would not be especially re-
source intensive because local law enforcement agencies must comply
with regulations as a condition of SCAAP;437 if SCAAP can be used to
incentivize enforcement, it can also be used to ensure immigrants' consti-
tutional rights are respected. This solution may be over-inclusive, but the
government could use this approach in programs that encompass identify-
ing immigrants that could be subject to criminal immigration penalties,
such as the SCAAP program.
This approach has been adopted in the tax and securities contexts even
in non-custodial interrogations. The SEC and the IRS provide Miranda-
type warnings to interviewees during non-custodial interrogation and re-
quire that individuals sign forms ensuring they are aware of their rights
and have validly waived them before questioning. The SEC provides a
form to all interviewees and witnesses who testify that informs them that
they may assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and that any information provided may be used against them.4 38
Under IRS guidelines, agents must provide similar warnings prior to cus-
437. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 391, at 2-3.
438. The SEC's warnings are contained on SEC Form 1662. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION SEC FORM 1662 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/secl662.
pdf (providing: "Information you give may be used against you in any federal, state, local
or foreign administrative, civil or criminal proceeding brought by the Commission or any
other agency. You may refuse, in accordance with the rights guaranteed to you by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to give any information that may
tend to incriminate you."); see also United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086
(D. Or. 2006), vacated in part and rev'd in part, 521 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2008).
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todial and noncustodial interrogation, which are entitled a non-custody or
an in-custody "statement of rights." 439 The in-custody statement tracks
Miranda, while the noncustodial warnings generally inform interviewees
of their privilege against self-incrimination and inform them that their
statements may be used against them.440
In addition to providing warnings, the government should ensure that
there is a suppression remedy available to deter the use of these state-
ments. Notably, because the IRS and SEC warnings are not constitution-
ally required, several courts have found that the agencies' failure to
inform individuals of their rights has no bearing on the admissibility of
any self-incriminating statements.441 The Court has also weakened the
Miranda remedy within its own jurisprudence. Given these constraints,
DHS and the Department of Justice should develop a policy that they will
not prosecute individuals who did not receive adequate warnings prior to
dual civil and criminal immigration inquiries.
Another alternative is that the federal government could require that
this questioning be administered outside the booking process. This solu-
tion would address the inconsistent case law on booking inquiries, and
make clear that such questioning complies with the dual civil and criminal
procedural strictures of Miranda.
In all of these solutions, affirmatively informing local officials is critical
for courts grappling with the applicability of Miranda warnings. Local law
enforcement agents would be on clear notice of the purpose of the ques-
tion and that criminal consequences could attach to the inquiry. These
solutions would ensure that suspects' constitutional rights are always pro-
tected because Miranda warnings would have to be provided by law en-
forcement agents for statements to be admissible. Furthermore, requiring
law enforcement officials to provide Miranda warnings ensures that sus-
pects are aware of and understand their constitutional rights.
439. I.R.S. HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS § 342.133 (1982) [hereinafter I.R.S.
HANDBOOK] (procedures for custodial interrogation); id. § 342.132 (noncustodial interro-
gation); see IRS, In-Custody Statement of Rights, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/36208003.
html; IRS, Non-Custody Statement of Rights, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/36208004.html.
440. The IRS noncustodial statement of rights provides as follows:
In connection with my investigation of your tax liability (or other matter), I
would like to ask you some questions. However, first I advise you that under
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States I cannot com-
pel you to answer any questions or to submit any information if such answers
or information might tend to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you
that anything you say and any documents which you submit may be used
against you in any criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise
you further that you may, if you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney
before responding.
I.R.S. HANDBOOK, supra note 439, § 342.132.
441. In United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 744 (1979), for example, the Supreme
Court found that the IRS's failure to follow its internal procedures regarding authorization




The convergence of criminal and civil immigration enforcement has
brought significant new challenges to long-established Miranda protec-
tions for immigrants, made more weighty by federal incentives involving
local law enforcement agents in both aspects of the federal enforcement.
As Miranda rules play a critical role in the conduct of all the actors within
the criminal justice system, the absence of uniformity creates specific
problems for immigration enforcement and risks for serious systematic
transgressions on a local and federal level.
This Article has sought to explore a new and under-theorized dynamic
of how Miranda jurisprudence is developing in an unprecedented manner
for immigrants in lower courts as well as the practical implications of the
new jurisprudence. To ensure that policies like those in Morris County do
not proliferate and that distinctions about long-established criminal pro-
cedural protections are not made along alienage lines in the courts or on
the ground, the federal government must provide clarity about the rights
guaranteed to immigrants by all actors within the system, including local
law enforcement agents empowered to enforce immigration laws. At a
minimum, Miranda requires that incarcerated suspects receive an une-
quivocal warning before being questioned about incriminating informa-
tion to protect their Fifth Amendment privilege of self-incrimination.
Furthermore, Miranda and its progeny require that individuals have the
right to invoke their Miranda rights and require that these rights be
respected.
This Article proposes that replacing the courts' inconsistent rules with
bright-line federal regulations will resolve confusion and strengthen the
Miranda doctrine, while bringing much needed clarity to local law en-
forcement officials. Such regulations will also adequately protect suspects
by preventing attempts by law enforcement officials to circumvent the
warning because those regulations will strengthen Miranda's own bright-
line rules. That is, regulation provides police with a clear standard to fol-
low and eases judicial review. Therefore, the bright-line rule will work to
eliminate coerced confessions, impermissible local policies, and pretex-
tual excuses by law enforcement officers that they were not aware of the
criminal consequences of the questioning.
Finally, without regulatory limits on the procedures used to question
incarcerated suspects about their immigration status, courts will continue
to waver and expend unnecessary resources to grapple with Miranda in a
manner that threatens to further narrow the Court's Miranda jurispru-
dence and create inconsistent rules to regulate officers' conduct.
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